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The  cognitive  and  decision  science  literature  on  modeling  and  aiding  intuitions  in  organizations  is
rich, but  segregated.  This  special  issue  offers  a sample  of that  literature,  stimulating  exchange  and
inspiring  intuitions  about  intuition.  A total  of 16 articles  bring  together  diverse  approaches,  such
as  naturalistic-decision-making,  heuristics-and-biases,  dual-processes,  ACT-R,  CLARION,  Brunswikian,
and  Quantum-Probability-Theory,  many  of  them  co-authored  by  their founders.  The articles  cover
computational  models  and  verbal  theories;  experimental  and  observational  work;  laboratory  and
naturalistic  research.  Comprising  various  domains,  such  as consulting,  investment,  law,  police,  and
morality,  the  articles  relate  intuition  to  implicit  cognition,  emotions,  scope  insensitivity,  expertise,
and  representative  experimental  design.  In  this  article,  we map  intuition  across  poles  such  as  Enlight-xpertise enment/Romanticism,  reason/emotion,  objectivity/subjectivity,  inferences/qualia,  Taylorism/universal
scholarship,  System  2/System  1, dichotomies/dialectics,  and  science/art.  We  discuss  intuitions  as  inspira-
tions,  instincts,  inferences,  and insights.  Finally,  we  review  the  contributions  to this  special  issue,  placing
them  into  historical,  philosophical,  and societal  contexts.
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“Oh lady lend your hand,” I cried,
“Oh let me rest here at your side.”
“Have faith and trust in me,” she said
and ﬁlled my heart with life.
“There is no strength in numbers.
Have no such misconception.
But when you need me  be assured I won’t be far away.”
(Lady in Black, Uriah Heep, Songtext)
Die Farben sind Taten des Lichts, Taten und Leiden.
The colors are the deeds of light: what it does and what it endures.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1810), Zur Farbenlehre
(Colour Studies), Translation: Miller (2012, p. 106).The two of us study decision making. When we talk to exec-
tives and other senior professionals about decision making, one
eaction we often get can be summarized as follows: ‘Many of my
ecisions are based on gut-feelings. Instincts of some sort. Ideally,
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I know what I need to do, the answer is simply there. For instance,
I simply knew that we  would need to build a new factory. But, I
cannot admit that openly. So what do I do? My  team and I spend
hours to search for facts to back up what I felt I knew all along.’ In
our experience, typically, it is the middle-management who  feels
that way. Top executives and managers in family-businesses are
more willing to admit that they make decisions based on intuition.
But even for them, there are limits to frankness, namely if they can
be held accountable at the end of the day in case something goes
wrong.
Indeed, the literature, both scientiﬁc and popular, is full of anec-
dotes and stories of people – artists, inventors, engineers, athletes,
physicians, managers, mathematicians, teachers, various experts in
their respective ﬁelds – who report instances where they just knew
how to assess a situation, how to decide, how to act, or how to create
something. Yet, such “knowing-how” is often hard, if not impossi-
ble, to describe and to justify. At the same time, we  tend to admire
people who  seem to have had – in retrospect – good but counterin-
tuitive intuitions, be it in science, business, or in daily life. In short,
intuition remains beautifully mysterious; we ambivalently waver
between wonder and bewilderment. Most of us encounter – once
in a while and more or less secretly – this unknown and elusive,
but surprisingly familiar Lady in Black.
Intuition, allow us to peak behind your veil! And please take it
with a smile if we  try to shed some light on you. We  know your
element is the night and you may  not like our torches, beaming
 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
1 esearc
i
e
t
r
m
h
t
w
(
i
d
b
f
n
e
u
1
w
a
o
c
w
t
i
w
B
s
w
r
p
b
(
p
a
i
i
i
n
t
i
l
o
c
h
A
–
c
n
w
n
d
s
i
h
a
t
f
t46 U. Hoffrage, J.N. Marewski / Journal of Applied R
nto the dark – your dark. We  apologize. But we are cognitive sci-
ntists, we are curious, and we want to learn more about you. At
he moment, we do not even know your gender. Do you bear closer
esemblance to Michelangelo’s beautiful David, or to Leonardo’s
ysteriously smiling, shadowy Mona Lisa? Maybe you do not even
ave any gender, even though the two of us would like to believe
hat you are female – maybe because we trust that there is some
isdom in those languages in which the day is a masculine word
der Tag,  le jour, el dia) and the night (die Nacht,  la nuit, la noche)
s  feminine, or simply because we are male, happily married, and
eeply admire our better halves. Maybe not seeing you clearly can
e described as a mental state of darkness and hence our name
or you, Lady in Black, is our own projection into our own  dark-
ess. We hope you like the name and we hope you will reward our
fforts with our torches by granting us some charming glances from
nderneath the veil of your mystery.
. Intuitive and historical accounts of intuition
What is intuition? For us, as researchers, it would be straightfor-
ard to screen the answers given in the scientiﬁc literature, provide
n overview of theoretical accounts of intuition and of method-
logical approaches to study it, and then to use this overview as a
ontext for the articles that we assembled in this special issue. Had
e proceeded this way, this would have been a standard introduc-
ion – not much different from other introductions to other special
ssues or edited books. We  started this way, but at some point
e felt that something important might be missing: the Lady in
lack.
Francis Bacon (1622/1938) provided a roadmap for the human
pecies. Where do we come from? Kicked out of Paradise. Where are
e now? Left alone, standing on our own. Where do we go? Unable to
eturn to God’s paradise, we only have one option: create our own
aradise – the Novum Atlantis (which also provided the title of his
ook). How to do this? Torture nature so that it reveals its secrets
an enterprise called science) and use this knowledge (an enter-
rise called technology) to survive and, eventually, also to have
 comfortable life on earth. Could this program also be applied to
ntuition? Tricky. We  dig a few knives into it, and once we know
ts secrets, this knowledge aids us to live and thrive? Alas, what if
ntuition is not just another “object” – another “it” – out there in
ature with organs that could be laid out on a dissection table? Or
hat could be moved into a brain scanner? Perhaps intuition really
s “subject” and “she”. And actually, how much can one, possibly,
earn when trying to catch intuition in psychological experiments
r when attempting to force her into mathematical models?
While scientists walking in Bacon’s footsteps may  struggle with
ompelling intuition to reveal its secrets, the “ungraspable” may
ave a closer relationship with artists. To them, she actually comes.
nd there she lends herself to being experienced and transmitted
 through paintings and poems, as mediums, for instance. And in
ontrast to scientists, CEOs and other leaders in society, artists do
ot need to justify themselves for letting intuition speak in their
ork, and for how they let her speak.
There is one problem though: The two of us are psychologists,
ot artists. So back to the dissection table? No. It is important to
istinguish between having intuitions on the one hand, and under-
tanding and modeling them on the other. Why  should scientists –
ncluding those who make intuition their object of study – not also
ave intuitions? To enhance the chances of having the Lady in Black
t our side, as our ghost author when writing the present piece, we
ried our best to embrace the mindset of an artist.
Speciﬁcally, we did not shy away from reproducing artworks,
rom weaving metaphors into the text, and from using a style
hat is quite unusual for a scientiﬁc journal – not even from bothh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
personalizing and anthropomorphizing the notion of intuition,
replacing the “it” with “she” and turning an “object of inquiry” into
a “subject”. Most importantly, we tried to think out-of-the-box and
to adopt a wider perspective. We took towering historical ﬁgures,
such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the German scientist, poet
and writer, or Leonardo da Vinci, the Italian inventor, scientist and
painter as stars to look up to and give us direction in our night.
There is one difference though: these two  were artists and scien-
tists throughout their entire lives – while, for us, the present piece
is more like a momentary excursion from the routines of publishing
in scientiﬁc journals.
Talking about excursions, Goethe is said to have escaped the
oppressive rules of courtly life on a trip to Italy where he, after
encounters with Italian artwork, received new impulses of utmost
importance for his future work, both as scientist and artist. Why
don’t we  do something similar: Make an attempt to escape from
our own, isolated, intellectual cave, explore the territory around us,
and locate ourselves in broader context? Let us depart on a journey
into the Enlightenment,  Romanticism, Sturm und Drang,  and meet
intuition, analysis, science and the contents of this special issue
through them.
1.1. Animalistic instincts, divine inspirations and the black-box in
the middle
Again, what is intuition? Many would use the term at vari-
ous, possibly quite diverse occasions. And even though people may
have an intuitive understanding of what intuition is, the possible
answers they would come up with will certainly show some vari-
ance. We  would like to structure the following candidate answers
by adding another question: “where do our intuitions come from?”
Locating objects or concepts, so one might argue in good scientiﬁc
manner, requires a coordinate system. For the purpose at hand, we
would like to draw one that follows from a statement of the Greek
philosopher Protagoras (c. 490–c. 420 BC): “Man is the measure of
all things.”  Putting us in the middle of our coordinate system, and
adopting the convention that animals are below us in a hierarchy
spanning from matter to the divine, let us start by looking upwards.
Is intuition a sixth sense, some kind of extrasensory perception,
an inner voice through which some supernatural beings – Gods,
Angels – speak to us? Note that the Latin word persona is composed
of per and sonare – “sounding through”. When having intuitions, do
we resonate with something that is transcended, that can be con-
ceived as being outside of us, possibly above, and that manages
to somehow and mysteriously affect us and to leave some kind
of traces or vibrations? According to this conception, a persona is
a facade, like a theatrical mask as those used in Ancient theatres.
In modern terms, one could say that an actor plays a social role
or a character, and it is the latter through which the actor, con-
cealed behind the mask, interacts with the world. Take, for instance,
Perseus or Dardanos, both sons of Zeus. Without doubt, the Ancient
Greek knew what this meant, but how can we, today, make sense of
the information that a mythological ﬁgure like Perseus or a histor-
ical ﬁgure like Dardanos is the son of a God? One  possibility could
be to say that Perseus was  more like a persona, a mask, and that the
real, true and hidden actor, Zeus, was acting through him. Intuition,
then, would be Perseus’ ability to hear what Zeus wanted him to
do, or, to put it another way, Perseus’ intuitions were Zeus’ orders
on how to play on the theatre called human life.
Others may  prefer to look in the opposite direction, namely
downwards. Is intuition some sort of animalistic instinct – and
do animals have intuitions, maybe even better ones than humans?
Staying within the animalistic sphere, but allowing this sphere to
enter the human kingdom: are intuitions an evolutionary remnant
of our reptilian brains, an old but fast track on the neuronal high-
way? Or are they located in the Freudian unconscious? And how
esearch in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 147
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ight these two concepts, the reptilian brain and the Freudian “id”,
elate to each other?
Note that these two conceptualizations – intuition as an inspi-
ation, an inner voice, possibly of divine origin or as an animalistic
nstinct – correspond to models of man  and to ideas about our
rigin: the fallen angel versus the dressed ape, respectively. Reli-
iously minded people and Darwinists may  resonate with these
iews, and some engage in intellectual ﬁghts with the other party
 think of the heated debates, in particular in the U.S., on how evo-
utionary theory should be taught in schools. Others may  be able to
ntegrate them and to embrace both. To challenge all parties a bit,
e would like to raise the question of whether or not such concep-
ions might be just projections, reﬂecting that there is something
e do not know and cannot clearly see? Maybe spatial arrange-
ents do not hold up to scrutiny anyhow: who could say whether
ur intuitions originate within us, whether they come from outside,
nd what difference it really makes whether we look upwards or
ownwards? The conclusion of such a sceptical position might be
hat intuition is, at the end of the day, nothing more than a catch-all
ategory for everything related to cognition that we  cannot explain
 bluntly speaking, a label for the black-box.
Wait a minute! Black-box sounds a bit like Lady in Black, doesn’t
t? We  must admit that, being scientists, we feel quite comfortable
ith adopting a sceptical viewpoint. Scepticism was also Descartes’
tarting point which later turned out to be the ground on which he
uilt his philosophy. So let us pause for a while, and reﬂect on the
bservation that we do not know exactly what intuition is.
.2. The days of the Enlightenment and the power of analysis
Up to this point, we  used many concepts and words that are
elated to light: day, unveil, night, dark, torches, beaming, reﬂect,
rojection, glances, seeing, viewpoint. With black being the absence
f light, the black-box and our dear Lady in Black belong to this
ist as well. We  can only see what is in the light, an insight that
erthold Brecht put in the following rhyme: “Denn die einen sind
m Dunkeln; Und die andern sind im Licht; – Und man siehet die im
ichte; Die im Dunkeln sieht man  nicht” (There are some who are
n darkness; And the others are in light; – And you see the ones in
rightness; Those in darkness drop from sight) (Brecht, 1928/2004).
n order to see what is in the dark we need to enlighten it. This
olds true for a dark room, but there is also some truth to it at a
ifferent level. There is not only sunlight, electric light, or ﬁre light,
ut, in a metaphorical sense, shedding light on something can also
efer to the human capacity to think and to apply reason. Like the
hysical light, thinking itself seems invisible, but it makes us aware
f everything that becomes its object. Using thinking and reason-
ng to illuminate the world surrounding us was the agenda of the
nlightenment, an era ranging from the 1620s to the 1780s, with
amous ﬁgures such as René Descartes, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza,
oltaire, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, or Isaac Newton, to name
ut a few. The Enlightenment’s thinkers were in constant intellec-
ual battle with traditional authorities (kings, feudal rulers, and the
hurch) and they emphasized and promoted reason, analysis and
ndividualism.
Let us zoom in on one of their goals and means. Analysis, as a
trategy, is ubiquitous and we ﬁnd it in many domains and disci-
lines. It amounts to decomposing a larger unit into its pieces, up
o the point at which these parts cannot be divided any further.
he endpoint of such an endeavor was the in-divisible part, the in-
ividuum (note that this Latin word is a translation of the Greek
-tom). Seen this way, ﬁghting for individualism and the rights of
ndividuals in society and politics (Elias, 1939/1991) and advocat-
ng analysis in philosophy and in the sciences are two  facets of the
ame idea.Fig. 1. Caspar David Friedrich: Man  and Women  Contemplating the Moon, Alte
Nationalgalerie, Berlin, 1835.
Analysis in chemistry means to intentionally separate materials
(molecules) into their ingredients or elements (atoms). Analysis in
philosophy is a method of presenting complex concepts as com-
pounds of more basic ones. Analysis in decision science means to
decompose a decision problem into smaller units: what are the
goals, the criteria, the arguments that speak in favor of the various
options, the possible consequences, the probabilities of events, the
weights that should be attached to certain criteria, and so on. In an
historical and often-cited letter, Benjamin Franklin wrote to Joseph
Priestly about how he could use an analytic approach to make
decisions, possibly the ﬁrst time that this procedure is explained
thoroughly. The idea is to break the complex problem into pieces,
put the components, that is the arguments for the two decision
options, on a scale to see how they balance out in what Franklin
called “moral or prudential algebra” (for the complete letter, see
Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999, p. 76).
1.3. Hymns to the night: Romanticism, feelings, and the
mysterious
The age of the Enlightenment gave way to Romanticism, which
originated in Europe at the end of the 18th century and spanned
until the 1850s. While ﬁgures of the Enlightenment pushed for rea-
soning and analysis, and wanted to spread the light, so to speak, the
Romanticists embraced the twilight and the night. For them, the
dark was not a scary place that one should better enlighten with
the light that is coming from within, but a place where something
else which they found inside could ﬂourish and grow. One of the
artists of this period was  Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840). His
paintings typically show nature with wide horizons, often foggy,
often full moon nights, and they express longing and mystery. This
is not nature as an object of scientiﬁc analysis, but nature as our
origin (note that the Latin root of nature is “to give birth”) to which
we are mysteriously connected and ache to return to at some point.
The paintings of Romanticism do not capture an objective reality,
but instead one of subjective and romantic feelings that emerge
from the inside, like sentiments that belong to and complement
nebulous but awe-inspiring landscapes. Maybe our intuitions can
be seen as corresponding to this deeply hidden part within our-
selves, possibly originating there? A picture is worth a thousand
words: Fig. 1 shows how mysterious the world appears when seen
by someone who  embraced the mystery within himself. Was  Cas-
par David Friedrich the painter, or was  he a persona through which
our Lady in Black unveiled herself?
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The Romantic Zeitgeist also left traces in the literature of that
ime period. Probably one of most representative poems from this
ra is Hymns to the Night by Novalis (1772–1801) – a drawing made
ut of a few letters that transmit more than a thousand words of
ntellectual reﬂections about what the night may  mean for us, psy-
hologically. Perhaps our Lady in Black was a hidden co-author back
hen, in 1800?
Before all the wondrous shows of the widespread space around him,
what living, sentient thing loves not the all-joyous light – with its
colors, its rays and undulations, its gentle omnipresence in the form
of the wakening Day? The giant-world of the unresting constella-
tions inhales it as the innermost soul of life, and ﬂoats dancing in
its blue ﬂood – the sparkling, ever-tranquil stone, the thoughtful,
imbibing plant, and the wild, burning multiform beast inhales it –
but more than all, the lordly stranger with the sense-ﬁlled eyes, the
swaying walk, and the sweetly closed, melodious lips. Like a king
over earthly nature, it rouses every force to countless transforma-
tions, binds and unbinds innumerable alliances, hangs its heavenly
form around every earthly substance. – Its presence alone reveals
the marvelous splendor of the kingdoms of the world.
Aside I turn to the holy, unspeakable, mysterious Night. Afar lies
the world – sunk in a deep grave – waste and lonely is its place. In
the chords of the bosom blows a deep sadness. I am ready to sink
away in drops of dew, and mingle with the ashes. – The distances
of memory, the wishes of youth, the dreams of childhood, the brief
joys and vain hopes of a whole long life, arise in gray garments,
like an evening vapor after the sunset. In other regions the light
has pitched its joyous tents. What if it should never return to its
children, who wait for it with the faith of innocence?
What springs up all at once so sweetly boding in my heart, and
stills the soft air of sadness? Dost thou also take a pleasure in us,
dark Night? What holdest thou under thy mantle, that with hidden
power affects my soul? Precious balm drips from thy hand out of
its bundle of poppies. Thou upliftest the heavy-laden wings of the
soul. Darkly and inexpressibly are we moved – joy-startled, I see
a grave face that, tender and worshipful, inclines toward me, and,
amid manifold entangled locks, reveals the youthful loveliness of
the Mother. How poor and childish a thing seems to me now the
Light – how joyous and welcome the departure of the day – because
the Night turns away from thee thy servants, you now strew in the
gulfs of space those ﬂashing globes, to proclaim thy omnipotence –
thy return – in seasons of thy absence.
More heavenly than those glittering stars we hold the eternal eyes
which the Night hath opened within us. Farther they see than the
palest of those countless hosts – needing no aid from the light, they
penetrate the depths of a loving soul – that ﬁlls a loftier region with
bliss ineffable. Glory to the queen of the world, to the great prophet
of the holier worlds, to the guardian of blissful love – she sends thee
to me – thou tenderly beloved – the gracious sun of the Night, – now
am I awake – for now am I thine and mine – thou hast made me
know the Night – made of me  a man – consume with spirit-ﬁre my
body, that I, turned to ﬁner air, may  mingle more closely with thee,
and then our bridal night endure forever. (Novalis, 1800/1992; see
also http://logopoeia.com/novalis/hymns.html)
Romanticism was like a contrast program to the Enlightenment,
ike the other pole of a swinging pendulum. And it was  not alone. “Le
œur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît.” (“The heart has its reasons
hat reason knows nothing of” or, in a related formulation,“we  know
he truth not only by the reason, but by the heart”.) Even though Blaise
ascal is usually seen as a ﬁgure of Rationalism, with this quote, so
ne might be led to believe (rightly or wrongly) he explicitly lim-
ts the realm of reason and rationality. In fact, in Western culture,
ost people would locate our intuition rather in the heart than in
he brain. And even though possibly most people would agree that
eliberate reasoning, analysis, and “cold” information processingh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
is something humans do, they would add and insist that there is
more to being human.
Take, for instance, Mr. Spock of the American Star Trek series.
He is the personiﬁcation of rationality; he uses logic to override
any emotion in an effort to control his feelings so that they do not
control him. Interestingly, he has non-human origins; his father
comes from the planet Vulcan. Of course, Mr.  Spock and this planet
are ﬁctions, but the minds of the scriptwriters are real and they
convey a message that reﬂects and shapes the folk theory of millions
of people who have watched this series: Emotions make us human
– suppressing them and functioning like a computer would be seen
as degradation.
Mr.  Spock can be contrasted with another ﬁctitious ﬁgure: Young
Werther, the main character of a drama of Goethe, published in
1774. Werther is full of emotions, feelings, and sentiments. In par-
ticular, he is overwhelmed by his love and torment, and is not able
to cope with them and to gain control. He cannot distance him-
self from his inner turbulences with a cold and rational mindset.
He lacks what Mr.  Spock has and vice versa. In the last act of the
drama, he commits suicide – which led to great irritations and dis-
turbances in the society of the time. The Sorrows of Young Werther
can be situated in the German literacy movement known as Sturm
und Drang (Storm and Stress) that took place from the late 1760s to
the early 1780s. Both this movement and Romanticism were united
in that they exalted nature and feelings and sought to overthrow
Enlightenment’s cult of rationality.
2. Analysis versus intuition today
The eminent ﬁgures of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and
other epochs are no longer with us, but much of their ideas and
artwork found their ways through the centuries and can speak to
our thinking and feelings. Even more importantly, they shaped our
worldviews, technologies, and institutions. In this sense, we stand
on the shoulders of giants – whether we  are aware of it or not – and
the past is still alive. We  will, in what follows, turn to a handful of
these echoes of the past.
2.1. The culture of objectivity and the ﬁght against subjectivity
This section heading is inspired by the titles of two publica-
tions. In “The culture of objectivity: Quantiﬁcation, uncertainty,
and the evaluation of risk at NASA”, Feldman (2004) analyses the
events that led to the explosion of the Challenger shuttle on January
28, 1986. Feldman traces the disaster back to a conﬂict between
engineers at Morton Thiokol, the supplier of the shuttle’s rocket
boosters, and the organizational culture in which these engineers
were operating, both at their own company and at NASA. The engi-
neers felt that it was  too cold on that morning of January 28 and
hence too risky to launch. The problem was that they could not
present sufﬁcient data to back up their judgment, simply because
there had not been a launch at such an exceptionally low tem-
perature before. The shuttle stood at the ramp, fully tanked, the
start had already been delayed, and if they would not start on that
day, the window of opportunity would close – in short, stakes and
pressure to launch were high. The engineers’ seemingly subjective
assessments, call them intuitions, did not get enough weight in
what Feldman called “the culture of objectivity”. The shuttle was
launched and exploded after 73 s into ﬂight.
The second part of this section’s heading is inspired by “Proba-
bilistic thinking and the ﬁght against subjectivity”, a book chapterand Hacking (1990). The culture of objectivity is not only domi-
nant at Morton Thiokol and NASA, but also in science. Gigerenzer
adopts an historical point of view and describes its origins in one
esearc
s
t
e
i
a
s
t
c
“
j
a
m
w
p
m
j
–
u
o
w
M
t
d
a
t
s
i
u
a
r
d
t
p
s
s
o
(
c
t
A
p
t
k
e
w
o
t
c
t
o
F
w
d
o
a
t
a
w
m
u
r
wU. Hoffrage, J.N. Marewski / Journal of Applied R
peciﬁc discipline, namely statistics. Numbers are seemingly objec-
ive and transparent. As the “probabilistic revolution” (Gigerenzer
t al., 1989) unfolded, they played an ever increasing role not only
n science but also in public policy and bureaucracy. The generals
round Napoleon, for instance, knew that if they wanted to have
omething from him, they had to give him numbers. And ever more
oday, not only scientists, but also governments and multinational
ompanies invest huge efforts in collecting data (and increasingly
Big Data”) which, in turn, serve as a basis for decisions, or their
ustiﬁcation.
What started in Europe with the Enlightenment (in a way,
lready earlier with Galilei: measure what is measurable, and make
easurable what is not so)  holds much of the industrialized world
ith an iron grip. Science, governments, corporations, and other
illars of society are built from fabrics of rationality, analysis,
easurement, quantiﬁcation, formalization, and objectivity. Sub-
ectivity and feelings are a private business, not to interfere in public
 at least not openly. And the place for those who do not overtly live
p to those ideals is certainly not the middle of society. Conclusions
r policy recommendations that cannot be grounded on numbers
ill have a harder time making an impact, and the engineers at
orton Thiokol were certainly not the ﬁrst or the last ones to learn
his lesson.
Even numbers themselves have problems when they cannot be
ressed, on face value, into the garments of objectivity. Then they
re scorned upon, and rejected by the majority. Inferential statis-
ics in the social sciences speak testimony of this. Take Bayesian
tatistics as an example. As Dennis Lindley (1983), one of their lead-
ng advocates, writes (pp. 10–11): “the Bayesian paradigm concerns
ncertainty . . . It applies to statistical, repetitive situations . . . But it is
lso applied to unique situations. We  are uncertain about the inﬂation
ate next year, the world’s oil reserves, or the possibility of nuclear acci-
ents. All these can be handled by subjective probability”. But rather
han also publicly ﬁghting for subjectivity and intuition to have the
lace they deserve in science, many Bayesians seem to adopt the
ame hypocritical mind set as those who overtly reject Bayesian
tatistics as subjective: In their attempt to live up to the ideal of
bjectivity, those split-brain Bayesians then simply use uninformed
uniform) priors. What an irony! At the end of the day, it may  all
ome down to pride and the questions whether one has the courage
o stand up to one’s subjectivity, or whether one prefers to hide it.
s I. J. Good (cited according to Grosan & Abraham, 2011, p. 202)
ut it: “The subjectivist (i.e., Bayesian) states his judgements, whereas
he objectivist sweeps them under the carpet by calling assumptions
nowledge, and he basks in the glorious objectivity of science.”
Whenever subjectivity meets statistics, thorny territory is
ntered. The ﬁght against subjectivity continues when asking
hich of the many rules and procedures, including the various tools
f inferential statistics, should be used to process seemingly objec-
ive input. But how many dare to ask in the ﬁrst place? How many
onsumers of SPSS, STATA, and psychology textbooks know that
here are, at least, three different notions of “level of signiﬁcance”:
ne developed by early Sir Ronald A. Fisher, a second by the late
isher, and a third by Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, each of
hich is markedly different from how most psychologists would
eﬁne this term today (Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015)? How many
f those who rely on .05 and .01 as seemingly objective criteria
ctually know that the convention of using these but no other cri-
eria appears to be a pragmatic one? (Fisher only had tables for .05
nd .01, most likely because his archenemy, Karl Pearson, was  not
illing to give him any others.)
Even worse, how many practitioners – judges, doctors, policy-akers, or other recipients of statistical information – really
nderstand the numbers they consume: probabilities, survival
ates, or risk reductions? Certainly fewer than one might
ant to hope for – not all beams shining down from theh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 149
Enlightenment program manage to reach the sphere of the mor-
tals (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke,
Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007; Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2002). And some-
times, others even intentionally deﬂect those beams into directions
that best suit them: be it industries who  use numbers to “prove”
the usefulness or harmlessness of their products (e.g., medications,
tobacco, pesticides), or governmental institutions which use num-
bers (e.g., about economic growth, presented prior to elections) to
inﬂuence citizens’ judgment. There are some subjects who manage
to hide within the culture of objectivity and who  pull the strings
from behind the scenes. They do not excuse themselves for being
subjective; rather they let their interests guide which statistical
model to apply, which representation format to use, and so on.
In short, the machinery for compiling and processing numbers is
necessarily fueled by subjective judgment. Some pretend they can
eliminate all such subjectivity, some others do not even understand
the subjectivity in the ﬁrst place, and yet others abuse it.
2.2. Inferences and qualia
The rational and analytic approach the Enlightenment pushed
forward is often combined with an engineering approach, partic-
ularly in modern times. This is not just an echo but a loud and
resounding thunder, with greetings from Francis Bacon. The idea is
that understanding something amounts to being able to construct
models of it, which may  eventually be implemented in mechan-
ical or electronic devices. This is objectivity and transparency in
its purest form: everyone can see the blueprint and will be able
to build the same machine; everyone can study a particular soft-
ware code and will get the same results (probabilistic components
in a computer simulation taken aside). Examples for such devices
that attempt to simulate the workings of cognition in artiﬁcial sys-
tems include neural networks and the ACT-R cognitive architecture
(e.g., Anderson, 2007; ACT-R, which stands for Adaptive Control of
Thought-Rational, will be introduced in detail below).
We cannot exclude the possibility that the researchers and engi-
neers who  construct those systems have intuitions when doing so
– we  believe and we hope that this was, is, and will be the case.
However, we  are not aware of any machine, system, model, or rep-
resentation of the human mind for which the inventor and engineer
claimed that his or her creation – sort of an electronic homunculus
– has intuitions.
Fair enough: If subjectivity has no place in today’s culture of
objectivity, why should such creations have subjectivity built in?
And how would this be possible at all? Could one build an arti-
ﬁcial intelligence system that has intuitions? If we  humans have
intuitions and machines do not, this may, indeed, make us spe-
cial and unique. Consider the following dialog between a critic of
artiﬁcial intelligence and such an engineer of cognition, promot-
ing artiﬁcial intelligence. Critic: “Humans are special; they can do
things that a machine will never be able to do. For instance, they
have intuitions!” Engineer: “Tell me  exactly what the difference
between man  and machine is and I will prove you wrong. Tell me
exactly what intuitions are and I will build a machine that has intu-
itions.” Note that there are at least two challenges here. First, specify
exactly what intuitions are, and second, build a machine that imple-
ments these speciﬁcations. Frankly, we  do not know which one is
the harder part.
We do know, though, that this little dialogue stimulates an inter-
esting question. Are intuitions statistical inferences that the human
mind is – at a subconscious level – drawing from data? (We  will
turn to the mind as intuitive statistician below.) If so, the engi-
neer has a chance; after all, inferential mechanisms can be built
into computer code and machines. But what if intuitions are sub-
jective experiences that we  have in the twilight? The human mind
draws inferences at an unconscious level. This may happen in smart,
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ast-and-frugal ways (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group,
999; Gigerenzer, 2007; Hertwig, Hoffrage, & the ABC Research
roup, 2013), in error-prone, biased, and fallacious ways (Gilovich,
rifﬁn, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), or
n yet other ways. The list of descriptions and models is endless –
hich, in itself is revealing and shows that we do not know exactly,
ut can only construct models of what is happening in the black box,
he home of our dear Lady. When these statistical inferences rise
rom the night and see the light of the day, that is, when we  become
onsciously aware of them, then we may  refer to these experiences
s intuitions. They emerge in the twilight – where darkness and
ight meet each other.
Here our engineer has a problem. Processing data is easy, but
hat is conscious awareness? Are intuitions qualia,  like the sub-
ective experience of color that cannot be captured by analytic
odels of light that merely decompose it into waves of differ-
nt lengths (Jackson, 1982)? Enlightenment meets Romanticism –
he past is still alive and echoes can be heard in the discussions
round artiﬁcial intelligence and philosophy of mind (Dennett,
993; Nagel, 1974; Searle, 1992). For sure, reﬂecting about qualia
nd conscious awareness sheds a new light on the distinction
etween objectivity versus subjectivity that we discussed in the last
ection.
.3. Taylorism in the organization of science versus holistic
orldviews: Places for intuition?
Analysis, objectivity, and quantiﬁcation come hand in hand with
 fourth ideal: specialisation. These four ideals did not always play
he role they do today. Aristotle’s insights, for instance, are not
ust inferences he drew based on some statistics that he had col-
ected – he rather had an encompassing view of man  and the
orld. Moreover, even though he is known as a philosopher, he
rote, in fact, about psychology, logic, epistemology, aesthetics,
atural sciences, political sciences, economics, and what not. And
e was not an exception – many philosophers in ancient times
ere like him. Or think of Leonardo da Vinci, who  might be best
nown for his Mona Lisa and other paintings, but who was a true
olymath, with interests ranging from sculpture and architecture
ver anatomy, geology, history, astronomy, botany, music, cartog-
aphy, mathematics to engineering and science. Or consider, three
undred years later, scientist-artist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe:
ichter und Denker and Universalgelehrter (i.e., “universal scholar”)
ho tried to understand Nature by adopting a generic, universal,
nd holistic view, in which the parts are not scrutinized in isola-
ion, but in which they remain integrated in encompassing units.
ndeed, in one of his most important dramas, Goethe (1808) lets
ephistopheles, the opponent of his main character, Faust, explain
he working of modern science: “Wer  will was lebendig’s erkennen
nd beschreiben, Sucht erst den Geist heraus zu treiben, Dann hat er
ie Theile in seiner Hand, fehlt leider! nur das geistige Band.” (“He who
ould study organic existence, First drives out the soul with rigid per-
istence; Then the parts in his hand he may hold and class, But the
piritual link is lost, alas!”).
Goethe was very sceptical towards analysis and torturing nature
n the dissection table. He was rather convinced that she would
nly reveal her secrets if we would trust our senses and avoid
ntersecting hypothetical constructs between us and the observable
henomena.
The golden age of the big Universalists seems long gone. With
he passing of time, Mother Philosophy gave birth to many chil-
ren – disciplines that later became known under their own  names.
niversalists gave way to specialized experts, afﬁliated to one of
any faculties and disciplines that divided the world into parts
nd focus on certain areas. Divide et impera! Even within a given
iscipline, speciﬁc analytic and pragmatic approaches are adopted.h in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
Such divisions – between disciplines and within disciplines – come
with their own  requirements and dynamics. The pool of knowl-
edge becomes larger, and it becomes more and more difﬁcult to
climb and stay on top of it. Indeed, today’s experts are all but gen-
eralists. Specializing on narrower and narrower domains seems
necessary to enable researchers to reach the edge of knowledge
in their domain, so they can push its boundaries. It is, perhaps, no
surprise that many researchers survive in this system by building
their careers on one pet-theory or on a single dependent variable
or experimental paradigm. The advantages are, seemingly, obvious:
an electric torch which focuses its light shines brighter at a particu-
lar spot than a torch with a wide area of diffusion – an observation
revealing that and why analysis and Enlightenment are brothers in
arms, loosely speaking.
This development can be described as a form of Taylorism, that
is, efﬁciency through specialization that allowed the institutions
in the modern sciences to become assembly lines for producing
both research and student output. And on the student side, at least
in Europe, the studium generale, or, universities’ universal edu-
cation, has given way  to specialization as well: The Masters and
Bachelors of the Bologna system produce a steady ﬂow of stan-
dardized pieces and spares of the size needed in various domains of
society.
Is this the holy land, the Novum Atlantis, that Francis Bacon has
seen in his prophecy and in which he wanted to lead us, under the
ﬂag of science and technology? Is this the ideal of the eminent ﬁg-
ures of the Enlightenment, the secularized priests of rationality and
analysis? Has Frederick Winslow Taylor seen these consequences in
the organization of science and in scientiﬁc organizations when he
advocated specialization and efﬁciency? “Oh, poor Lady in Black”,
one might cry out, “is there a place for you in our modern scientiﬁc
institutions governed by objectivity, quantiﬁcation, analysis, and
specialization?”
Intuitive is often associated with holistic.  To the extent that this
association does not come out of the blue, the distinction between
an analytic and a holistic worldview deserves a closer look. Obvi-
ously, the program of the troika (Bacon, Enlightenment, Taylor)
grants advantages, but there is no free lunch. Its price-tag is what
is lost in the aggregation of the small pieces, in the coordination of
the specialists, who focus on analytical depth and thereby forego
the holistic big picture in which everything is related to every-
thing. Mephistopheles was right: “But the spiritual link is lost, alas!”
(Goethe, 1808).
What is meant by the spiritual link? The Latin spiritus means
“to breathe”, which, in turn, refers to a process that connects inside
and outside – subject and object. Grown up and embedded in our
culture of objectivity we  easily forget about us as subjects and
observers (Lehrs, 1985). But in fact, there is no object without sub-
ject, and no subject without object. What does it mean to say that
a subject sees an object? The light enlightens everything it shines
at. We  already pointed out that this does not only hold true for the
light out there that physicists study, but also for the inner light (call
it thinking) through which we  see the world. Granted, without sun-
light or other forms of physical light we cannot see anything. But
what if the sun is shining at a particular spot and no one is there to
see? How are the light out there and the inner light related to each
other?
“Das Auge hat sein Dasein dem Licht zu danken. Aus gleichgülti-
gen tierischen Hilfsorganen ruft sich das Licht ein Organ hervor, das
seinesgleichen werde, und so bildet sich das Auge am Lichte fürs Licht,
damit das innere Licht dem äusseren entgegentrete”  Goethe (1810, p.
x) “The eye owes its existence to light. From among the insigniﬁcant
ancillary organs of the animals light calls forth the organ to become its
like, and thus the eye is formed by the light and for the light so that the
inner light may emerge to meet the outer light.” (translation: Miller,
2012, pp. 105–106).
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One can adore what one sees out there, in the “all-joyous light”
Novalis) of the day. Moreover, it is relatively easy and straightfor-
ard to implement and pursue the program of Francis Bacon, and to
se reasoning and analysis to study the things we  see during day-
ime (note that measuring radioactive decay in a dark room and
eading off the instruments with the help of electric light during
ighttime would not be substantially different). Finally, one could
ven analyze the physical light and break it into pieces, as Sir Isaac
ewton did. Newton, one of the great ﬁgures of the Enlightenment,
onceived our sunlight as being composed of waves with different
engths. But with these “parts in his hand”, to reiterate from the
uote of Goethe’s Faust, Newton would not be able to tell how the
nner light is related to the outer light (Steiner, 1897). We  should
dd that the “scientiﬁc-workers” (Fisher, 1956, p. 42) in any of the
nowledge production factories in the footsteps of Taylor are not
ble to answer this question either – we are back to the discussion
n qualia, conscious awareness and philosophy of mind.
This is possibly the mystery the Romanticists were after, with
heir mistrust in the scientiﬁc rationalization of nature and their
mphasis on the experiencing subject. It is deﬁnitely the mystery
nthroposophy is all about. Anthroposophy, founded by Rudolf
teiner (1861–1925), is a monistic and holistic philosophy and a
piritual worldview that encompasses man  and nature alike, that
onnects macrocosm and microcosm, and that relates the outer and
he inner light. Rudolf Steiner, whose books and lecture series ﬁll
00 volumes and who inaugurated numerous movements in soci-
ty and arts, tried – and many would argue successfully – to shed
ight at our night side. The scientiﬁc community ignores his work.
.4. System 1, System 2, and the Lady in Black
The culture of objectivity, analysis, and quantiﬁcation and the
ise of statistics not only had a fundamental impact on society and
cientiﬁc practices, it also led to new research questions. Soon after
he culture of objectivity in form of statistics had entered psychol-
gy departments and the methodological toolbox of researchers,
ome psychologists asked whether not only enlightened statisti-
ians but also naïve participants could count and analyze data.
Naïve” means: without a pen to facilitate counting events, and
ithout any statistical training or instructions on how to process
umerical information. In a classic article, entitled Man  as an intu-
tive statistician,  Peterson and Beach (1967) concluded that people
an estimate means and variances fairly well. What is interesting is
heir use of the term “intuitive”. If a person “somehow felt” that 40%
f marbles in an urn were blue, then this was, according to Peterson
nd Beach, an intuitive estimate by an intuitive statistician. Was  it
he same Lady, who possibly helped Caspar David Friedrich painting
andscapes and Novalis writing poems, who helped undergraduates
stimating proportions?
The next step was from summarizing data and descriptive statis-
ics to inferences. In a book entitled Cognition as intuitive statistics,
igerenzer and Murray (1987) no longer dealt with means, pro-
ortions, or variances but with more complex questions: How do
aïve participants intuitively estimate probabilities of data given
ypotheses? The converse question, how to intuitively estimate
robabilities of hypotheses given data, has also been extensively
tudied: to what extent is the human mind a Bayesian? From
he 1970s on, numerous researchers examined how much help
ur Lady in Black granted to undergraduates who  have been
onfronted with textbook problems that probed intuitions about
tatistic, logic, or probability theory. The factory producing all these
esearch outcomes became known as the heuristics-and-biases pro-
ram, spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (e.g.,
ahneman et al., 1982). According to this program, people use sim-
lifying heuristics when it comes to probability judgments andh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 151
these heuristics cause cognitive biases, that is, systematic and pre-
dictable deviations from statistics and probability theory.
The heuristic-and-biases program can be seen as a counter-
image to the inheritance of the Enlightenment. The philosophers
and mathematicians of the Enlightenment stressed rationality,
logic, and reasoning. When asked about how probability theory
is reﬂected in mortals, Pierre Simon de Laplace (1814/1951), for
instance, was  convinced that probability theory is “only common
sense reduced to a calculus” (p. 196). Similarly, Jacob Bernoulli
wrote, in a letter to Leibniz dated 1703, that the law of large num-
bers is a rule that “even the stupidest man knows by some instinct of
nature per se and by no previous instruction.”
But they were not psychologists and they did not collect data to
check whether this was  actually the case. When Kahneman, Tver-
sky and all the scientiﬁc workers did exactly this, they found out
that the philosophers of the Enlightenment were wrong. In view of
this mismatch between is and ought, it did not take long for labels
to be invented. Reponses that are consistent with what the mod-
ern priests of the Enlightenment declared as rational are seen as
originating from System 2 – and responses that amounted to norm
deviations are seen to originate in System 1.
Let us take a closer look at this distinction. In fact, there is a fam-
ily of so-called dual-process theories (e.g., Evans, 2009; Kahneman,
2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) that use these labels
with slightly different meanings. For the purpose at hand, it is suf-
ﬁcient to just drop some terms that are used by at least one of
the authors writing on dual processes. System 1 is often referred
to as intuitive, fast, experiential, implicit, automatic, effortless,
irrational, hot cognition, emotional, affective, associative, whereas
System 2 is analytic, slow, symbolic, explicit, controlled, effortful,
rational, cold cognition, deliberate, rule-based. The characteristics
of System 2 obviously read like a portrait of l’homme éclairé (the
enlightened man). But is System 1 portraying our Lady in Black?
One may  be tempted, at ﬁrst glance, to say yes: a response or reac-
tion that comes spontaneously, fast, and intuitively seems to come
out of nowhere, that is, out of the dark.
At this point we  want to return to Protagoras and his support
for our attempt to localize intuitive accounts of intuition. To the
extent that intuitive responses are System 1 responses, and vice
versa, System 1 closely resembles the animalistic instincts. In fact,
many of the attributes often used to characterize System 1 suggest
that the functioning of this system is basically built on automatic
frequency processing – a capacity shared by both humans (Hasher
& Zacks, 1979) and animals (Gallistel, 1990). According to the Dar-
winian framework, animals and humans are not as distinct as some
perceive them to be. Consider Edward Thorndike’s law of effect:
“Responses that produce a satisfying effect in a particular situ-
ation become more likely to occur again in that situation, and
responses that produce a discomforting effect become less likely
to occur again in that situation” (Gray, 2011, pp. 108–109). This
law describes the behavior of cockroaches, pigeons, rats, chimps,
toddlers, scientists, and CEOs. Further note that this law requires
the ability to process frequencies and to draw inferences – specif-
ically, to process the information how often a particular response
in a particular situation led to a particular effect. In fact, not only
undergraduates, but also animals seem to be intuitive statisticians,
and Animal cognition as intuitive statistics would also make a good
book title. Decades of research in Behaviorism have shown that ani-
mals are very sensitive to incentive schemes and that they can learn
very quickly and accurately whether the probability of receiving
food is higher when the blue or red light is on. In sum, System 2 is
the class primus of the Enlightenment, possibly located in the pre-
frontal cortex, and System 1 is something we share with animals,
possibly located in our reptilian brain.
Is there also a place for the Romanticists in the dual-process
theories? Where is our Lady in Black as Caspar David Friedrich and
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ovalis might have seen her? Should we build her a home in the
andscape of psychological theories and call it system 3? Could this
ome be located in the brain and eventually be gauged and mea-
ured with EEG and fMRI studies? We  do not think so. She is a
ersoniﬁcation of the dark side within us. If something pops up
rom this dark side some may  refer to it as intuition. Some of these
ast and spontaneous responses may  be possible because we are
ood intuitive statisticians who processed frequencies in the past.
n this sense it may  be appropriate to say that she lives – and hides
 in System 1.
But then we have, once in a while and all of a sudden, also ideas
ow to restructure thought elements when solving a problem. This
ay  happen to engineers who try, for a long time, to tackle a partic-
lar challenge. Or it may  happen to authors who think about how
o best arrange the arguments and metaphors in a text. And it hap-
ened to chimpanzees who tried to get a banana that Wolfgang
oehler ﬁxed at the ceiling of their cage in Tenerife. They had some
oxes available in the cage, but they did not have any experience
ith this situation. They were jumping, crying, they got upset – to
o avail. All of a sudden, Sultan (Koehler’s smartest chimpanzee)
eemed to have an idea, stacked the boxes, climbed up and reached
he banana (Köhler, 1963). That was not a System 1 response, and
lso not pure luck, but obviously a very goal-driven activity. Koehler
nd his colleague Max  Wertheimer used the term insight to refer to
he joyful experience that accompanies a successful restructuring of
affordances” (to use a term introduced by Gibson, 1977) in a prob-
em space. Usually there is some logic that is inherent in operations
nd affordances are not arbitrary. If an engineer is able to solve a
roblem while thinking hard about it and applying the knowledge
he learned at the university, most would probably see this as a
ystem 2 activity. But what if this insight comes all of a sudden,
eemingly out of nowhere? This “out of nowhere” could eventually
lso be “out of the night” – literally. If we work on a problem for
0 min, get interrupted or sleep it over for a night, and then con-
inue for 30 min, it is more likely that we ﬁnd the solution than if we
ork for 60 min  in one piece (Sio & Ormerod, 2009). It seems that
ur mind is able to make use of such incubation times even on some
ubconscious level – which relates incubation to intuition. If prob-
em solving, as the Gestalt psychologists have conceptualized it, is a
ystem 2 activity, and if this activity can also continue during night
ime and leads to insights later on, the Lady in Black seems to be
ble to also approach us through System 2! And who  knows, often
he Lady may  not need a night during which we sleep, or a period
uring which experimenters distract their participants with other
asks to control the total time that they spent on problem solving.
he may  even take the liberty to visit us during problem solving. We
ay, all of a sudden and seemingly out of nowhere, have intuitions
hile thinking hard, subsequently we validate these intuitions, and
fter having seen that they contributed to solve the problem we call
hem insights.
System 1 and system 2 are often discussed and contrasted as
ichotomies. Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) questioned this
pproach and argued that both could be built on the same prin-
iples and mechanisms. We  posit that there is yet another shared
eature: Our Lady in Black is with us everywhere and she does not
are how we categorize and label the places where she will whisper
o us.
.5. Dichotomies, deﬁnitions, and dialectics
We  want to pause here for a while and reﬂect on where our
ourney led us so far. Adopting Protagoras’ coordinate system, we
tarted with an understanding of intuition that assumed the exis-
ence of a Divine sphere and that conceptualized intuitions as
nspirations from Gods, Angels, or whomever. Then we  looked in
he opposite direction and suspected that intuitions may  be akinh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
to animalistic instincts. Finally, we looked in the middle, so to
speak, and have seen . . . an imponderable black box. We  took this
observation as a starting point and contrasted light and darkness,
Enlightenment and Romanticism, rational and emotional, objectiv-
ity and subjectivity, inferences and qualia, analytical and holistic
worldviews, Newton and Goethe, System 2 and System 1.
The list of dichotomies just given reﬂected the path we have
taken so far. The following list is a bit more comprehensive and
follows a different order. We  invite you to read it twice, one time
row-wise and one time column-wise. Subsequently, try to add or
insert a few more dichotomies. We  will tell you below what this
exercise is about.
analysis intuition
bright dark
white black
clear unclear
open concealed
explicit implicit
rules associations
reason emotions
male female
controlled impulsive
steered automatic
effortful easy
slow fast
thought instinct
human animal
culture the wild
educated ignorant
enlightened clouded
rational error-prone
objective subjective
truth fantasy
realism idealism
adult child
educator to-be-educated
nudging to-be-nudged
government citizen
authority anarchy
. . . . . .
Note that each of the three lists of dichotomies – the one we
met  along the path of the current article, the one provided by dual
process theories, and the list for our little exercise – is related to the
human sphere, either cognitive or social. To complete the picture,
we would like to add, at this point, still another list of dichotomies
– one that forms the basis for the Chinese Taijitu philosophy.
This philosophy is not about cognition, knowledge, experience,
or social affairs, but mainly about the outer world. Yin and Yang
are two  forces in nature. Yin is characterized as slow, soft, yield-
ing, diffuse, cold, wet, and passive; and is associated with water,
earth, the moon, femininity, and nighttime. Yang, by contrast, is
fast, hard, solid, focused, hot, dry, and aggressive; and is associated
with ﬁre, sky, the sun, masculinity and daytime (Osgood & Richards,
1973). Even though yin and yang seem to oppose each other, they
act complementarily or antagonistically. In the well-known yin-
yang symbol, we do not see two  areas that are strictly opposed,
rather it seems one originates from and moves into the other, and
vice versa.
In fact, it is easy to see the white area (yang, day) moving into the
black one, and the black area (yin, night) moving into the white one,
which amounts to seeing the symbol rotating clock-wise. More-
over, the white area contains a seed of black in it, and vice versa.
Hence, even though the symbol shows two  different principles, it
also visualizes that they are intertwined.At this point, we want to get back to Aristotle and to Goethe.
In his Nicomachean Ethics,  Aristotle does not assume a simple
dichotomy between good and bad, or between virtues and vices.
Rather, what is good or virtuous is always in constant battle with
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wo poles. Each virtue is a golden mean between two  vices. Being
rave, for instance, is the middle-ground between cowardly run-
ing away and being rash, reckless and careless. In fact, a continuum
pans between the two  poles, and hence there are various virtues
long this continuum. Being courageous is a virtue, but it is already
 bit closer to the pole of being reckless. Being cautious is also a
irtue, one that is closer to the pole of being a coward. The same
an be said for other virtues, for instance, those between the vices
f being greedy and being wasteful.
We  ﬁnd a similar constellation in Goethe’s Theory of Colors in
hich something new emerges in the middle ground between two
pposing poles. For Goethe, physical colors are not just waves of
ifferent lengths, as his analytically-minded intellectual antipode
ewton suggests, but “deeds of light: what it does and what it
ndures” (Goethe, 1810; Miller, 2012, p. 106). While for Newton
arkness is the absence of light, for Goethe darkness is polar to light
nd interacts with it. For Newton, the physical colors are already in
he light, they are just invisible because they cancel out. For Goethe,
n contrast, the light itself is homogenous and not composed of col-
red elements. These colors only emerge if light meets darkness in
urbid media such as air, dust or moisture. According to Goethe,
ellow is a light which has been dampened by darkness; blue is
arkness weakened by light. Daily visible examples are the yellow
un or moon (light dampened by dusty air; the thicker the atmo-
phere, the more the yellow turns into orange or red), the blue sky
darkness of outer space weakened through dusty air), or the blue
ceans (darkness seen through turbid water). An experimentum cru-
is that could determine whether Newton or Goethe is right does
ot exist, and would not make sense. The two simply focus on dif-
erent aspects of reality. According to Lehrs (1985), “the theory of
ewton and his successors was based on excluding the color-seeing
aculty of the eye,” and focused, instead, on mathematical models.
n contrast, “Goethe founded his theory on the eye’s experience of
olor”, which, not surprisingly, was not considered to be hard sci-
nce. Here they are again, the culture of objectivity and the ﬁght
gainst subjectivity. Qualia had and have no place in the world of
hysics. While artists ﬁnd Goethe’s approach more useful for their
ork, the natural sciences teach Newton’s theory.
From yang and yin, from light and darkness, back to analysis and
ntuition. Instead of trying to deﬁne intuition, we have so far been
laying with metaphors and dichotomies; and we  have painted a
icture, akin to a painting from Impressionism that consists of many
ittle dots. Deﬁnitions are marking borders (Latin deﬁnire means “to
et bounds to”). Consistent with an analytic approach, deﬁnitions
ivide and separate. To appreciate an impressionistic painting one
eeds to go in the opposite direction: not getting closer to inspect
he dots in more detail, but stepping back to connect the dots when
verseeing them from a distant, holistic point of view. This is what
he above exercise was about.
In fact, one can see two pictures, one in the left column in our
able above and one in the right. What emerges if these two pictures
re compared to each other? How are analysis and intuition related
o each other? Are these dichotomies, opposing each other? Or like
in-yang, intertwined and complementing each other? Or like poles
ith the potential that something new can emerge in the middle,
ike virtues between vices? Or like light and darkness that, together,
ave the potential to let colors emerge in the twilight?
Western philosophy and thinking is apparently biased towards
nalysis. It can be seen as a huge Enlightenment program to gain a
etter understanding and control of the world, including ourselves.
t led to the sciences, and it produced technologies, thereby follow-
ng Francis Bacon’s vision and simultaneously creating and leading
s into his Novum Atlantis. It conquered the world. The Aborigines,
ustralian natives, who live(d) in their Dreamtime (or should we
all it their ‘Age of Intuition’?) did not come to Europe and the U.S.,
ut cell phones found their way to the land down under.h in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 153
Why  should this program halt when it comes to explaining intu-
ition? Moreover, why should this program use methods other than
reasoning and analysis – why  should it change a winning horse?
One may  indeed have mixed feelings when scrutinizing intuition
with an analytical mindset – feelings that may  not be so differ-
ent from those that small scale societies may have had when they
have seen the ﬁrst white invaders some centuries ago. Isn’t theoriz-
ing about intuition as perplexing as illuminating a full moon night
with strong neon light so that one can see everything more clearly
– including why two lovers ﬁnd such a night so romantic? What do
you think of your own intuitions: can they be analyzed, dissected,
and decomposed? Every theoretical account tries to shed light on
some object, but theoretical accounts of intuition are quite spe-
cial. They try to shed light on something which may  be conceived
of as the opposite, namely darkness and mystery. Could it be that
these attempts, paradoxically, destroy what they are after? Do such
attempts simply chase away our Lady?
On the other hand, if intuition is related to the dark side within
us, as we  suggested, what is bad about looking into the mirror to
also shed some light inside, so to speak? At the forecourt of the
Temple of Apollo at Delphi, the adepts could read engraved “ ˜
	
ó” (gnothi seauton; know thyself). We are not surprised that
the scriptwriters of Star Trek decided that Mr.  Spock – a personiﬁ-
cation of pure reasoning – is only half-human. At the same time, we
are convinced that following what Immanuel Kant described as the
motto of the Enlightenment, sapere aude (dare to know), is another
element of what makes us human.
What we  just described corresponds to yang (the light, the white
area) moving into the yin (the night, the dark area): analysis and
scientiﬁc inquiry choosing intuition as their target. But what about
the black area as the origin of the white area (in the rotating sym-
bol), and what about the black dot inside? We suggest that no
matter how bright the light will shine, the other pole – the dark-
ness – is always present. When considering scientiﬁc approaches
and theories that try to shed light on our elusive Lady who lives
in the dark, the question arises where the light comes from and
who inspired those theorists. Could it be that intuition is occa-
sionally helping even the most enlightened scientists, including
those who  try to unveil her? Or consider decision aids that imple-
ment an analytic approach. It all looks very objective, precise and
quantitative – at ﬁrst glance: consequences are quantiﬁed on util-
ity scales, and a limited number of criteria are weighted such that
the relative importance of these criteria is captured. Everything is
crystal-clear and transparent, and the ultimate number crunch-
ing can be performed by a computer to determine which option
receives the highest score. But where do these utilities and weights
come from? They look objective once they are plugged into an
excel sheet, but upon closer inspection, it soon becomes clear that
our Lady in Black may  not be a passive bystander when a decision
maker “somehow” comes up with them. For the sake of complete-
ness, what would correspond to the white dot within the dark area?
Well, we need to have some conception and understanding of intu-
ition; otherwise we  would not be able to talk about it in the ﬁrst
place.
Note that the dialectics between yin and yang and how they
interact and inﬂuence each other is also reﬂected in theoretical
approaches in psychology – for instance, in Brunswik’s (1952)
notion of quasirationality, which has been further developed in
Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum Theory (Hammond, 1996, 2000,
2010; see also Dhami and Thomson, 2012). The notion of quasira-
tionality points at a combination of analysis and intuition. It is the
mode of cognition in the middle-ground between the two extreme
poles. Simon (1987) expressed this idea as follows: “intuition is not
a process that operates independently of analysis; rather, the two
processes are essential complementary components of effective
decision-making systems” (Simon, 1987, p. 61).
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We  will now ﬁnish this part of the current article that could have
een written as if there was no special issue on Modeling and Aiding
ntuition in Organizational Decision Making.  We  adopted a broad per-
pective and met  our dear Lady in Black in various forms. We  met
er as inspirations, possibly from sources that some might locate
utside ourselves. We  met  her as animalistic instincts that come
n form of intuitive statistics. We  met  her as statistical inferences
hat can, for instance, be described as stemming from fast-and-
rugal heuristics. And ﬁnally we met  her as insights that we may
ave when we engage in problem solving or restructuring. The
ommon denominator is this: In each of these forms, something
merges from the dark side within us. What comes out of our dark-
ess interacts with conscious awareness, it becomes an object that
an be scrutinized and analyzed, and we may  wonder “Where did
his idea, this hunch, this gut feeling come from?” The inner light –
hinking, reasoning, and rationality – that the eminent ﬁgures of the
nlightenment lifted on the throne which was, before, occupied by
eligious content, shines into the darkness and attempts to under-
tand. We  cannot tell exactly where this inner light comes from and
hy it disappears while sleeping. Sleep is said to be the little brother
f death, and we  also do not know anything about before and after
ur life on earth. But we feel that both sides, the inner day and the
nner night, belong to us. Enlightenment and Romanticism have
een eras in history, but they are more: what was driving their rep-
esentatives is constituting each of us. Subconscious inspirations,
nstincts, inferences and insights are not intuitions, but once they
eave the dark side within us and we become aware of them, they
urn into intuitions. Adopting Goethe’s theory of colors, intuitions
re like colors that emerge in turbid media, in the sphere of twi-
ight, where light and darkness meet and interact with each other.
ntuitions are messengers that enter our all-joyous days, and they
emind us of our own origin: the mysterious night side.
. Pictures at an exhibition
This section headline cites the title of a suite composed by Mod-
st Mussorgsky (1839–1881), an innovator of Russian music in the
omantic period. The ten movements of this suite paint, through
usic, the world of gnomes, of an old castle, catacombs, and they
ven include a sparkling ballet of unhatched chicks in their shells.
ypical for Romanticism, Mussorgsky’s creations all play with mys-
ery. In what follows, we will give you a guided tour through the
reations that we have collected for our exhibition. These creations
re not paintings, poems, or music, but scientiﬁc articles. And as
ou will see, they are everything but mysterious. Yet, much like
nspiring paintings, poems, or music, they all invite to intuit and
eﬂect – namely about our Lady in Black.
Who  are those whose creations we exhibit? First and fore-
ost, they all are enlightened scientists – individuals, who have
ttempted to ﬁnd and to describe, eventually also to model, the
races of our Lady. In addition, many of them are, what one is
empted to call, the tribal elders: half of all articles in this issue
ave a (co)author who was already at retirement age when com-
osing his or her piece. They include founders of several inﬂuential
esearch programs on intuition, four former presidents of the Soci-
ty of Judgment and Decision Making (including the ﬁrst two), former
r current editors of general and specialized psychology journals
e.g., Psychological Review, Judgment and Decision Making, Deci-
ion), and even a former student of towering Psychologist Egon
runswik. And these wise, experienced tribal elders include several
hose creations have been, if one believes Google Scholars Citation
ounts, explicit topics in about 10,000, or 100,000 other pieces of
ork – just imagine a painter’s, poet’s or composer’s work would
e acknowledged 10,000 times in the work of other painters, poets,
nd composers: that would be quite unique, wouldn’t it?h in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
How did we get those, whose creations we  exhibit, on board?
First, we contacted a number of individuals who had already, in
the past, shared their experiences and encounters with our Lady in
Black, and/or of whom we  thought they could trigger stimulating
avenues for research on intuition. We wanted to inﬂuence as little
as possible these authors’ intuitions, associations as well as their
analyses and reﬂections. They were invited to submit contributions
of their own  taste – opinion pieces or empirical work, single or co-
authored articles – and also to depict or unveil intuition in whatever
way they wanted. Those who  accepted our invitations include John
R. Anderson, Jon Baron, Rex Brown, Jerome Busemeyer, Mandeep
Dhami, Kenneth Hammond, Robin Hogarth, Gary Klein, Christian
Lebiere, Thorsten Pachur, James Shanteau, Paul Slovic, and Ron Sun.
Second, to further increase our chances of obtaining some interest-
ing glimpses at the Lady, we sent an open call for papers to various
research communities, newsletters, and mailing lists. Also for those
submissions, we tried to offer as much ground for creativity as pos-
sible. After inevitable rejections, a few withdrawals, and numerous
night-shifts, 16 papers written by a total of 38 different authors
were left to be presented.
How did we arrange these 16 contributions in our exhibition? All
authors produced their work without knowing much (or anything)
about the others’ pieces. They also did not know which metaphors
we would use in the present article at the entrance gate to this exhi-
bition, in which context and frame we would put their work, and
which connections we  would see between their articles. Frankly,
for a long time we did not know either. In fact, the 16 articles can
be classiﬁed along many dimensions and hence there are many
ways to assign them to different rooms in our exhibition, and many
ways to order them in the present guide. We  are not able to specify
how exactly we ﬁnally settled on one of the many possible arrange-
ments, but now that we  walk through the ﬁve different rooms that
we describe in the following ﬁve subsections, we  feel that they
radiate harmony. The Lady in Black, so we  believe, is said to like
harmony – not only between nature and man, as in Romanticism,
but also between reason and feeling. Maybe she helped us a bit?
3.1. Experience, expertise, and environments
The ﬁrst three contributions to our exhibition are all single-
authored by distinguished researchers: Gary Klein, James Shanteau,
and Kenneth Hammond. Each of them is, as one of them (J.S.) put it
in an email to us, “no longer dependent on new publications for pro-
motions and pay raises. These days, I only publish when I want to,
not because I have to.” Two  of our ﬁrst three articles do not contain
a single data point, and the third contains only a few. Having seen
and organized innumerate exhibitions themselves, these authors
leaned back, so to speak, and wrote opinion pieces in which they
adopted a wide perspective and reﬂected upon decades of their own
but also others’ thinking, theorizing, and ways to conduct research.
As another commonality, their articles focus on experience,
expertise, and on the natural environment in which experience
can be gathered and expertise can develop. The ﬁrst variation
of this theme, we look at, has been composed by Klein (2003):
Intuition results from experience. Experience, in turn, produces
experts. Given repeated exposure to various situations, these
experts learned about the statistical structure of the environment,
that is, they learned which cues are important and which ones are
less so when assessing a situation and when predicting outcomes.
The experts learned how these cues inter-correlate, and they
learned distinguishing certain conﬁgurations of cues – patterns
that are meaningful to experts but that novices may  not recog-
nize as such (Simon, 1987). This conceptualization also informed
the name of Klein’s account: the recognition-primed decision model.
Finally, and most importantly, these experts also learned what the
best course of action is for which pattern. Accordingly, Klein deﬁnes
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intuition as the way we translate our experience into action”  (2003,
. iv). Such learning does not necessarily lead to explicit knowledge
hat can be verbalized, but can result in implicit, tacit knowledge.
hat is, people with a rich experience base may  not necessarily be
ble to provide reasons for why they judge and decide as they do
 instead they have a gut feeling and know intuitively how to act
for a discussion of this distinction between explicit and implicit
nowledge, see Chassot, Klöckner, & Wüstenhagen, 2015; see also
un, 2015). Following this account, the Lady in Black speaks to us
hrough some sort of automatic frequency processing. She detects
hich cues are relevant and even complex patterns do not really
ose a challenge to her. However, she can only be at our side if
e have done our homework and made sure that we accumulated
hat she needs as input: experience, experience, and experience.
Experience leads to expertise (see the writings of Shanteau) and
o intuition (see the writings of Klein). These two  links translate
nto a series of methodological imperatives: To study intuition one
hould not put undergrads on Francis Bacon’s dissection table in
 sterile laboratory room. One should also not try to study their
eﬂexes while torturing them with textbook problems. Instead, one
hould observe experts in their natural environments, for instance,
reﬁghters in burning buildings, or pilots in airplane cockpits. Many
cholars follow this imperative in the context of what became
nown as the Naturalistic Decision Making program. This program
as initiated in 1989 in a conference that took place in Dayton,
hio, where more than thirty professionals met  to share their expe-
ience with and to discuss their ideas for studying “cognition in
he wild” (this term cites a book title by Hutchins, 1995; for more
nformation on naturalistic decision making, in general, and the
ayton conference, speciﬁcally, see Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood,
 Zsambok, 1993; Lipshitz, 1993; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; and
ww.macrocognition.com).
In his article, Klein (2015) describes the naturalistic deci-
ion making approach to intuition and contrasts it with two
ther frameworks, namely the fast-and-frugal heuristics and the
euristics-and-biases research program. Like the recognition-
rimed decision model, the fast-and-frugal heuristics program
osits that intuition develops through the interaction with the
nvironment. Many of the fast-and-frugal heuristics can be formal-
zed as algorithms, implemented in computer code and examined
n computer simulations. Performance is assessed in terms of ﬁt
etween environmental structure and an actor’s goals. In contrast,
he majority of heuristics proposed in the context of the heuristics-
nd-biases program are rather vaguely deﬁned, and performance
s assessed against “laws” of logic, probability theory or rational
hoice theory – not against the person-ecology ﬁt. According to
his program, intuitions are seen as a source of deviations, biases,
nd errors from these laws (see also Kahneman & Klein, 2009). In
is article, Klein offers seven suggestions for theory construction
nd research practice resulting from his synopsis of these three
ifferent approaches.
Based on his rich experience from studying experts, Shanteau
2015) focuses on a puzzle that is related to the experience of these
xperts. If experts in the same ﬁeld share similar experiences and if
ntuition is based on experience, then these experts should develop
imilar intuitions and they should generally ﬁnd themselves in
greement with each other. Shanteau provides a brief overview of
he literature that speaks to this question and concludes that this
s, indeed, often the case – but that there are also many studies that
eport the opposite. He discusses this heterogeneous pattern and
xplains the variance in terms of differences between the domains
n which the experts gathered their experiences and developed
heir intuitions. Whether intuitions are good and whether experts
evelop the same intuitions depends not only on the experts them-
elves, but – to a larger extent – on the environment for which they
ained their expertise.h in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 155
Another author who stresses the importance of the environ-
ment is Hammond (2015), albeit, not like Shanteau does. Instead,
he focuses on domain-speciﬁc differences related to the design of
studies. Hammond advocates the methodological imperative that
cognitive processes (including intuition) should be studied using
a representative design.  The notion of representative design has
been developed by Egon Brunswik as an alternative to system-
atic design. The latter usually selects, often manipulates – and
sometimes even artiﬁcially creates – stimuli in order to disentan-
gle the causal inﬂuence of several factors that could impact the
response of interest. This is what most of us do! Brunswik argued
that the set of stimuli used in a study with a systematic design
is most often not representative of the set of stimuli in the nat-
ural environment – to which people’s cognition has adapted. His
alternative, representative design, can be implemented by sam-
pling stimuli representatively of the environment, for instance, by
randomly sampling (for an overview of representative design, see
Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). Brunswik’s work suggests that
the Lady is, well, easy to deceive. If we  gain experience in a natural
environment but are subsequently brought into an environment
which is not representative of our natural environment, the Lady
may  still speak to us – but we should better not listen as our inferen-
tial mechanisms behind which she will conceal will lead us astray
(Fiedler & Juslin, 2006).
Many of the researchers contributing to the heuristics-and-
biases program do not seem to care about representative design,
and some may  not even be aware of this concept. However, for
researchers from the naturalistic decision making community,
interfering with the environment and using artiﬁcially created
stimuli is not ideal to study intuition. In his paper for this spe-
cial issue, Hammond adopts a historical perspective and reﬂects
on the origins and receptions of representative design. And who
could be a better author for this paper? Hammond was  the last liv-
ing student of Brunswik and in his essay he takes us back to the
very beginning of his career – back to the 1940s at the University of
California, Berkeley – but then covers six decades of debate center-
ing around the concept of representative design, thereby discussing
the work of Gerd Gigerenzer, Daniel Kahneman, Phil Tetlock, and
others. Unfortunately, we  had to start the previous sentence with
“Hammond was”. On April 28, 2015, he passed away at a “bibli-
cal” age of 98 after a career spanning seven decades of theoretical
and empirical contributions to the ﬁeld of judgment and decision
research. The present paper is for sure one among the last (if not
the last) he has written. We feel extremely glad and honored that
we can include it in the present special issue, and we believe he
would be delighted as well if he could see the context (i.e., the
other papers) in which his essay appears.
3.2. Formal models and cognitive architectures
The previous room in our exhibition assembled pieces that
focused on methodological aspects – intuition should either be
studied in the same natural environment where it had developed,
or with a representative design. The subsequent three pieces illus-
trate another methodological aspect of studying intuition, namely
how to model it.
Most intuition research employs verbal descriptions or informal
models. The widespread use of verbal descriptions and informal
models is also reﬂected in this special issue: we  will see such
research in every of our exhibition rooms – with the exception
of the current one. In the current section, we will turn to formal
descriptions of intuition: computational and mathematical models.
In doing so, we will not focus on those type of formal models that
are, to a large extent, well-known in mainstream intuition research.
Instead, we  move into a room in our exhibition that displays a class
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f models that, though forming part of halls of fame in other areas,
eserve attention in intuition-research, too: cognitive architectures.
To appreciate what formal models and cognitive architectures
re, let us, with the help of one of our authors, brieﬂy caricaturize
heir antipodes. The following is an extract from an email, written
y James Shanteau in the context of the review and production
rocess of his contribution to this special issue.
“When I started discussing expertise in the 1970’s, it was common
to use the concept of schema to explain the development of expertise
(and much else in cognitive psychology). When I tried to pin it down,
however, I couldn’t ﬁgure out whether schema referred to a rule, a
process, an outcome, or all of the above. I concluded that schema
could mean whatever the user wanted it to mean, i.e., an universal
explanatory principle.
I had a similar experience trying to ﬁgure out what situation
awareness (SA) meant – a concept ﬁrst tied to expertise in military
settings. For instance, expert pilots could be the best because they
have SA. But SA was offered as the explanation of what separates
experts from novices. The circularity of the reasoning made it, to
me, an empty concept.
Intuition is not quite in the same boat as either schema and SA,
but it seems dangerously close.”
Shanteau’s lines reﬂect experiences we made when trying to
nd descriptions and models of the traces of the Lady in Black
n the scientiﬁc literature. What, initially, started out as a quest
“How have others described you?”), quickly turned into despair
“Oh dear Lady in Black, who has not tried to turn you into an object
f scientiﬁc inquisition?!”). Thousands, so it seemed, dedicate their
ife to trying to hunt “it” down: intuitions. But what exactly is
eing hunted; that is, what do different authors really mean when
hey use the term “intuition”? Entering this term in Google Scholar
ields, nowadays, more than 1,000,000 hits. Of course, we have not
orked our way through all of them, but going through a sample of
rticles was already enough to support the suspicion that different
uthors had different concepts in mind, even though they used the
ame word.
We  were reminded of Rorschach testing in psychoanalysis:
nkblots were shown to people, people generated associations, and
hese associations were used as data and interpreted by psychol-
gists (who were, albeit on a higher level, hence doing the same:
hile people interpreted ink plots, psychologists interpreted inter-
retations). Everyone would see something in these inkblots, just
s everyone is able to see something in clouds, or as the ancient
reek were able to see Perseus and other mythical ﬁgures in star
onstellations (note that the names they gave to these star constel-
ations persist today). Likewise, everyone will be able to associate
omething with “intuition”, “gut feeling”, or “fast thinking” – which
ay come dangerously close to the Babylonian confusion in which
eople speaking different languages could no longer understand
ach other.
Fuzzy scientiﬁc concepts akin to Rorschach inkblots certainly
ave their merits: associations or even some misunderstandings
ay  trigger new research, and they stimulate creativity. With
heir low level of precision, informal approaches correspond to the
oft yin-element. Not surprisingly, they evoke the yang-element –
hich comes as formal theories. Let us now go through some of
he arguments for the latter (for overviews, see Fum, Del Missier, &
tocco, 2007; Lewandowsky, 1993; Marewski & Olsson, 2009).
Formal theories allow tackling problems where verbal theories
end to fail: (i) verbal theories and their predictions tend to be hard
o nail down; (ii) their relative vagueness makes it more difﬁcult to
ompare them to competing theories and predictions; (iii) verbal
heories can be tricky to integrate in common frameworks; (iv) ver-
al theories can only capture certain levels of complexity. Last but
ot least, a reason why verbal theories have problems is actuallyh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
not that the theories are verbal. Rather, it is an argument about a
confound: many of those working with verbal theories may lack
the programming and mathematical skills required to design and
test complex theories. Such lack of expertise lets many verbal the-
ories to be shaped less by reality and more by technology – namely
by SPSS and other programs that allow running off-the-shelf anal-
yses (e.g., t-tests, ANOVAs, regressions) on off-the-shelf research
designs (e.g., simple factorial experiments).
While informal accounts of intuition are quite popular, the for-
mal  approaches are still comparatively rare. Most scientists making
the Lady their object of inquiry are, at most, willing to dissect intu-
ition – be it in the lab or the natural world – but they refuse to do
more. Why? Is it, perhaps, that the ungraspable becomes even less
graspable if one wants to force her into what might look like intel-
lectual chastity belts (equations), or even worse, tortured by iron
maidens (computer code)? How can one intuit intuition with some-
thing as unintuitive as hundreds of lines of code or mathematical
analyses? While formal theories seem like chastity belts and iron
maidens for some, for others the verbal theories seem like colorful
costumes, worn during experimental shows of magic: sawing-the-
women tricks of some sort; some very interesting, some rather
boring, and some silly but sexy.
By exaggerating and simplifying features or traits, caricatures
can aid perceiving the real thing. In reality, both magic costumes
and chastity belts are degrees on a continuum. In fact, many theo-
ries are neither solely formal or verbal. Glöckner and Betsch’s (2008)
connectionist model of intuitive decision making, for instance,
explicitly rests on both math and verbal assumptions. Indeed, on
its own, theorizing at formal or informal levels is neither “good”
nor “bad”. Clearly, both levels of description have their own  mer-
its and, actually, also their own  problems. Both can be interesting,
informative, and insightful – like the work presented in the ﬁrst
three papers of this special issue, which we  hope you enjoy as much
as we do. And both can border re-description and tautology. This
can happen when a theory does not attempt to model processes.
Examples are mathematical equations with free parameters that
carry no explanatory value, but that are given quasi-psychological,
marketable labels (e.g., “risk aversion”). Examples are also observa-
tions (e.g., of behavior) turned into “explanations” for what is being
observed – just think of the many fashionable personality traits
(e.g., “extraversion”) populating the psychological and organization
science literature.
Moreover, what is an advantage on some grounds can translate
in hurdles on others. To illustrate this point, mathematical or com-
putational precision can aid testing. But dealing with mathematical
equations or computer code also requires expertise in the cor-
responding formalism (e.g., a programming language). And while
codes and equations can be shared, they also need to be translated
into verbal arguments in journal publications. Informal theories,
in contrast, do not require translations. They rely on common (e.g.,
English) language as their only medium and can, hence, both be eas-
ily understood by and communicated to others. And it does not take
much to see how enhanced comprehensibility can promote spread,
or how communicability can aid usefulness. Just imagine a world
where the religious, legal, or administrative texts are available in
incomprehensible language only, requiring experts to understand
them and to translate them into the language of John Q. Public.
One of us recently had a conversation with an IT consultant. The
consultant confessed that his business is, simply speaking, mak-
ing more money, if more laws and regulations are created, and
if these are becoming increasingly complicated. Companies have
to adapt to them, and they can do that, so the argument goes, bysoftware automatically generating paychecks, deducing taxes, cal-
culating social security beneﬁts, or software creating and updating
all pertinent warnings to accompany the products to be sold. The
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oftware simpliﬁes a complex tasks for companies, namely to play
ithin the rules.
In research, a parallel to what the consultant does is the imple-
entation of verbal theories in formal models. Formal models – be
t the scientist’ theory or the consultant’s software – reduce ambi-
uity and leave less room for interpretations and maneuvers. They
hape, control, and valuate outcomes – be it in that they precisely
eﬁne which states of the world are, actually, in line with a the-
ry, or that they deﬁne that world in the ﬁrst place. They can aid
o establish an objectivity of some sort. On the other hand, “holes
n the law”, can give agents (e.g., companies, scientists) rooms for
nterpretability and the ﬂexibility that is often necessary when hit-
ing on new, unknown, or complicated problems. Here we meet
hem again, the two archrivals objectivity and subjectivity, this
ime they can be best labeled rigidity and ﬂexibility.
The formal approaches we have caricatured above can be lined
p on a continuum, marked by two poles: One pole is occupied
y models that focus on isolated aspects of cognition (e.g., “intu-
tion”) or tasks (e.g., ﬁre-ﬁghting), while the other pole belongs to
ognitive architectures. Cognitive architectures are computational
or mathematical) models that strive to integrate multiple com-
onents of cognition (e.g., perception, memory, decision making,
otor action) into one uniﬁed theory. This uniﬁed theory then,
deally, interacts with the world (e.g., the statistical structure of
he environment) and applies to diverse tasks, domains, and phe-
omena (e.g., strategy selection, aircraft controlling, mathematical
easoning, intuition, probability matching, forgetting).
One of these uniﬁed models is the ACT-R cognitive architec-
ure (e.g., Anderson, 2007). This architecture is central to the ﬁrst
rticle in this section, co-authored by Thomson, Lebiere, Anderson,
nd Staszewski (2015). Cast as computer code (available at http://
ct-r.psy.cmu.edu/), ACT-R is, arguably, the most detailed and most
idely used of the architectures around. Other examples of archi-
ectures, though not discussed in this issue, include EPIC (Kieras &
eyer, 1997) or SOAR (Newell, 1992). ACT-R has been applied to an
rray of phenomena in a variety of ﬁelds, ranging from probabilistic
nference (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005), insight (Anderson, Anderson,
erris, Fincham, & Jung, 2009), and the learning of mathematics
Ritter, Anderson, Koedinger, & Corbett, 2007) to multi-tasking
Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008). Pointing out that cognitive architec-
ures have played little role in exploring intuitive decision-making
rocesses, Thomson et al. (2015) explain central features of ACT-R,
ffer reasons for using ACT-R, and discuss how the ACT-R frame-
ork might help us better understand intuitive decision making
rocesses. In so doing, they posit that instance-based learning is
onsistent with the kind of intuitive decision-making processes for-
ulated by Kahneman and Klein (2009). They also conceptualize
iases as emerging either from the cognitive architecture, the envi-
onment, or the use of strategies which allow adapting to cognitive
nd environmental constraints.
ACT-R can be called a hybrid architecture. Its symbolic part is a
roduction system; while its sub-symbolic system is cast in terms
f parallel processes, which can be summarized by a set of math-
matical equations. The next article, an opinion-piece written by
un (2015), takes us into the universe of another architectural
ramework: CLARION (Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule
nduction ON-line; e.g., Sun, 2014; Hélie & Sun, 2010; informa-
ion available at http://www.clarioncognitivearchitecture.com). In
is article, Sun offers us a snapshot of dual processes theories –
ystem-1, System-2 and its associates – viewed through the lenses
f CLARION. In discussing the work of Evans (e.g., 2009), Kahne-
an  (e.g., 2003), Sloman (e.g., 1996), and others, Sun replaces the
istinction between intuitive versus reﬂective thinking with that
f implicit versus explicit processes and raises what he takes to
e critical issues with that distinction. For instance, he points out
hat intuition may  not be strictly automatic; it can be consciouslyh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 157
controlled and manipulated. He also points out that intuition may
be slow, rather than fast. He describes how CLARION might allow
for exploring some of the issues he raises. His article closes by
sketching out how CLARION might help addressing social and orga-
nizational phenomena.
The third article in this series complements the conceptual
pieces written by Thomson et al. (2015) and Sun (2015): Juvina,
Lebiere, and Gonzalez (2015) provide a detailed example of model-
ing work in the social domain. Speciﬁcally, much of what happens in
organizations is some sort of social interaction – be it with clients,
suppliers, or colleagues. It is a truism that trust is an important
element of successful, repeated interactions. One might argue such
trust, in turn, is shaped by evidence – direct and indirect. Direct evi-
dence is one’s own observations, while indirect evidence might be,
for example, gossip about a person, or information found in social
media. Evidence can be used to inform intuitions about the out-
comes of likely future interactions (e.g., if you betrayed me  once,
you may  betray me  again). At the same time, the more often an
interaction takes place, the more opportunities for forming and
reﬁning intuitions there are. One can also call this process “learn-
ing”: acquiring evidence, drawing conclusions based on it, getting
feedback on the correctness of the conclusions, and updating. In the
long run, expertise can develop. Indeed, expertise – not only about
our partners in social interactions, but also more generally – can be
thought of as playing out learned intuitions; much like the expe-
rienced CEO, politician, or spouse, who has a “gut feeling” of how
to react to a business partner, a coalition partner, or the beloved
one. Juvina et al. dive into this world of trust, learning, and intu-
ition. Speciﬁcally, these authors present an ACT-R model to explain
how learning transfers across two  games of strategic interaction:
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken. In doing so, Juvina et al. bring
together different lines of research. The ﬁrst is work on intuition
and expertise, the second is formal modeling (in their case, with the
ACT-R architecture), and the third stream of research they integrate
in their paper is behavioral economics.
3.3. Prescription, aiding, and rationality
So far we  discussed papers that describe and/or model cognitive
processes in general and intuition in particular. We  now move into
a room with three pictures that have prescription as a theme. By
means of an introduction, here are some historical remarks on the
relationship between prescriptive and descriptive approaches.
Interestingly, the ﬁrst formal theory of decision making under
risk, Expected Value Theory,  does not make the distinction between
prescription and description, and is instead both at the same time.
Pascal and his contemporaries of the 17th century, and also later
the philosophers during the Enlightenment, perceived no differ-
ence between how l’homme éclairé (“the enlightened man”) should
reason and decide and how he actually did it (Gigerenzer et al.,
1989). Observe, by the way, that the enlightened and rational man
was, at least at that time, male, whereas intuition, the mysterious
Lady in Black, was female (for an historical perspective on the ques-
tion concerning intuition’s gender, see Gigerenzer, 2007). Human
reasoning was perceived to follow the rational calculus – a view
that is echoed in, for instance, the psychology of Jean Piaget (Piaget
& Inhelder, 1969). A more modern version of this view is rational
analysis (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1998) with its
conviction that studying what people should do is a good starting
point for understanding what they actually do.
In a letter written in 1713, Nicolas Bernoulli, invented and for-
mulated an intriguing problem. We ﬂip a fair coin until it lands on
tail. If this happens with the ﬁrst throw, the win is 2, if it happens at
the second throw it will be 4, 8 for the third throw, 16 for the forth,
and so on. What would be the fair price to pay the casino for play-
ing this lottery? Everyone could see that following Expected Value
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heory would dictate one to pay an inﬁnitely high price for this
icket – while everyone, including the smartest mathematicians,
hilosophers, and promoters of Expected Value Theory were only
illing to pay relatively low prices. It was an earthquake in the land
f rationality. In 1738, Nicolas’ cousin, Daniel Bernoulli provided a
olution to this problem and published it in the Commentaries of
he Imperial Academy of Science of Saint Petersburg,  hence the name:
he St-Petersburg paradox (Gigerenzer et al., 1989). The solution was
ased on a transformation of the objective values. People’s sub-
ective values can be modeled as the logarithms of the objective
onetary values. Bernoulli’s proposal was nothing more and noth-
ng less than the birth of Expected Utility Theory.  It took another 200
ears, during which this theory was not modiﬁed, until John von
eumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) formulated the axioms of
xpected Utility Theory. If probabilities are not known, but need to
e subjectively estimated, Expected Utility Theory turns into Sub-
ective Expected Utility (SEU) theory.  This theory was, and for many
oday still is, perceived as the rational approach to decision mak-
ng. Being rational means to adhere to all axioms of SEU theory, and,
onversely, violating any of them means being irrational.
It did not take long time after von Neumann and Morgenstern (a
athematician and an economist, by the way) had axiomatized SEU
heory for psychologists to enter the scene (e.g., Edwards, 1954).
hey were interested in the question of whether people actually fol-
owed SEU theory. The answers were mixed. While Maurice Allais
1953) reported a systematic violation of a central axiom of SEU
heory (this violation became known as the Allais paradox), Ward
dwards (1954) concluded that people are, by and large, rational.
his conclusion was challenged in the late 1970s and the 1980s by
he heuristics-and-biases program whose goal was to document
nd model deviations from SEU theory or from any other normative
nd rational benchmark.
The heuristics-and-biases program was very productive and
nﬂuential at two fronts. First, in the academic world it produced
n avalanche of studies reporting irrational behavior and decisions
 there is the saying that on their way to the Annual meeting
f the Judgment and Decision Making Society one colleague asks
nother “What’s the bias of today?” Second, and possibly even more
mportant, this program inﬂuenced an armada of consultants and
eachers (e.g., at business schools), many of them psychologists,
ho approached companies with a simple message: “Your man-
gers fall prey to all kind of biases and pitfalls. We  can inform
hem about these pitfalls and thereby help them to make bet-
er decisions”. This message sold very well, opened many doors,
nd created many jobs (see also Lopes, 1991). Were the propo-
ents of the heuristics-and-biases program able to build bridges
etween academia and practice? While we anticipate some vari-
nce in the answers, we think that the following statement should
e uncontroversial: The scientiﬁc work provided legitimacy to the
onsultants, and the consultants provided material, examples, and
ata to their research colleagues.
“We  help you to avoid pitfalls (studied by psychologists) in
our managerial decisions” is one door-opener for the consultants.
nother could be “we help you to apply prescriptive models of
ecision theory (developed by mathematicians and economists) to
olve your problem”. How interested were companies and policy
akers in this second offer? With this question, we  are exactly
here our next contributor, Rex Brown, starts. The author reﬂects
n his attempts, spanning over 40 years, to build bridges between
cademia on the one hand, and players and organizations in the
orld of business and politics, often at the highest levels, on the
ther. He knows both worlds from the inside: He describes him-
elf as alternating between consulting and faculty appointments.
rom his “practitioner’s perspective” he concludes that the “use of
uantitative applied decision theory and other formal decision aid
as, so far, been surprisingly small given the initial optimism ofh in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
the 1950s” (Brown, 2015, p. 213). One of the reasons for this lack
of appreciation that Brown discusses is organizational constraints:
Often, ﬁrms and political parties have their own  agendas, histo-
ries, path-dependencies, cultures, and routines that impede with
effective and efﬁcient decision making. In a nutshell, the prescrip-
tive models are great but many organizations are not yet ready
for them. The crowd in the street cannot stand the beams origi-
nating in the Enlightenment and shining through the centuries and
through the models developed by rational and analytically-minded
scientists. Another reason for the lack of acceptance boils down to
the opposite: the organizations operate in an uncertain world and
applied decision theory does not deserve its name since its models
are often too remote from the complex realities out there, or its pro-
ponents speak jargon and cannot communicate to executives such
that those can understand. In a nutshell, the enlightened priests
on their mission to bring rationality into this dark world were not
able to build the bridge, they have not learned the language of the
primitives, and they do not understand what these mortals really
need in the wild. Brown (2015) reports various tragic attempts to
let the sun of rational thinking shine into the fog and darkness
where business and political leaders – and our Lady in Black – are
at home. He gives us some insights into such difﬁculties but he
is nevertheless “hopeful that decision-aiding practice and decision
science research can, indeed, be integrated into a productive sym-
biosis where aiders identify their research needs and communicate
them to scientists, who respond effectively” (p. 217) and, lucky for
us and our readers, he offers various suggestions towards this goal.
Hogarth and Soyer (2015) are concerned with aiding decision
makers and with bridging theory and practice as well. Imagine
an analyst who  needs to communicate probabilistic information
to a decision maker, say, to a CEO interested in sales forecasts.
That CEO does not necessarily have the best statistical intuitions;
she may  know little or nothing about, for example, the bias-
variance dilemma or the importance of using different data sets
to ﬁt and test models (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). How can
inevitable uncertainties be best conveyed? One way might be to
depict degrees of conﬁdence graphically. Yet, while pictures can
convey strong messages, conﬁdence intervals (or other attempts to
quantify uncertainty) may  not be equally accessible to everyone.
Hogarth and Soyer discuss three different ways – decision aids, one
could say – of how to inform decision makers about uncertainties
in forecasts. They include (1) description, like graphical informa-
tion displays, (2) simulation, and (3) mixtures of both. In contrast
to mere description, simulation is an experience-based approach –
akin to problem-based learning and case-based teaching (see e.g.,
Dietz et al., 2014). The idea is to allow people to experience the
involved uncertainties in vivo before making decisions. One way
to think of this simulation approach is as aiding decision mak-
ers toward developing useful intuitions for themselves through
experience, whereas a description approach represents to decision
makers the intuitions (or conclusions) drawn by others. Hogarth
and Soyer themselves draw an interesting parallel to story-telling:
Much like the analyst needs to know what data to present and how
to present them in order to convey a message, a story teller needs
to know what to say and how to say it to a given audience. Hogarth
and Soyer point out that well-crafted stories (and also case-studies,
by the way) empower the audience to draw their own conclusions.
This approach is in stark contrast to libertarian paternalism (Thaler
& Sunstein, 2008). Libertarian paternalism does not aim at building
intuitions, but, instead, nudges people into what somebody else, a
policy maker, has identiﬁed as being “good” or “correct” (for a dis-
cussion, see Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015; and for an extensive
discussion on Educating Intuition, see Hogarth, 2001).
Story-telling and simulation offer one way to develop intuitions
– namely, by experiencing them. The third paper in this series illus-
trates another way: That intuition is often deﬁned and pinned down
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y contrasting it with in-depth analysis and reﬂection. Most ways
o conceive of analysis and reﬂection, in turn, follow the lead of clas-
ic approaches to human rationality: the maximization of expected
tility, which typically requires the weighting and adding of rele-
ant information. What happens when classic probability theory
s used as a means for grasping rationality? The heuristics-and-
iases program gives a resounding answer: People violate various
orms. This answer has soon been challenged by shifting the blame
rom naïve participants to the researchers: the norms were often
oo narrow, the theoretical accounts of what people were doing
nstead were too vague and an ecological account was  also rarely, if
ver, adopted (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996, 2004; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage,
 Kleinbölting, 1991). Quantum Probability Theory can be seen as
nother attempt to challenge the norm, and thereby to rescue the
ationality of behavior – just like the St-Petersburg paradox did not
ead to declaring all who felt prey to it as irrational. Instead, not
he people but the norm was in trouble, and Daniel Bernoulli went
ack to the drawing board and changed the norm.
Something similar can be said for Quantum Probability Theory.
his theory and its potential for understanding intuition is the topic
f White, Pothos, and Busemeyer’s (2015) article. As these authors
oint out, what appears to be irrational when seen through the
enses of classic probability theory appears to be rational when
een through the lenses of Quantum Probability Theory. Hence, it
ll depends on the sort of light that is cast on behavior and judg-
ents and, in turn, which norms are applied to evaluate those.
here is an interesting observation that can be made here. Classical
robability theory is not very hard to understand, notwithstand-
ng the fact that many experiments seem to suggest that naïve
articipants violate its norms. As a consequence, it does not take
uch to declare such deviations – for instance, if someone esti-
ates p(A) < p(A&B) – as “irrational”. From there it is not far to
abelling them as “intuitive.” In contrast, understanding Quantum
robability Theory is a bit more challenging. It seems that one needs
uite a sharpened and sophisticated mind to develop a complex
ormative framework that, in turn, allows one to present intu-
tive responses of naïve participants as rational. This observation
rovokes the following question: If cognition typically thought of
s irrational can be turned rational, just through a change of per-
pective, then what deﬁning features are considered to be intuitive,
nreﬂective cognitions? And what are the implications for research
rograms that are either built on, or that strongly resonate with,
hese distinctions, including the heuristics-and-biases framework
r System-1-System-2 associates? White, Busemeyer, and Photos
nspire us to think about these and related questions.
.4. Sentencing, valuation, and moral judgments
Being a good researcher can be hard, but operating in an aca-
emic institution and assuming various roles also has its challenges.
he two of us repeatedly ﬁnd ourselves in situations in which we
eel that we should treat a particular student or colleague in a par-
icular way. The problem is that there are rules for these “cases”
nd applying them often suggests something else. The term “cases”
lready reveals the whole conﬂict.
For many decades, we had a rather inﬂuential administrator in
ur faculty. He was a lawyer. We  will refer to him, henceforth, as
awrence (not his real name). How often did we hear from him
but ﬁve years ago, we had a case in which.  . .”  We felt that this
as the wrong approach and that we should not talk about cases,
ut about people. Cases may  be similar, but every person is unique,
ight? Lawrence turned people into cases by focusing on features
hat were speciﬁed in the rules of our faculty – and he ignored
verything else. The argument was then: these cases have A in com-
on, so they should all be treated equally. Enforcing rules and equal
reatment was his absolute priority. Our ﬁrst priority was to treath in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 159
everyone in a fair manner. Often we  intuitively felt that for one
particular student, with the features A, B and C, the right thing to
do would be X, and for another one, with features A, B, and D, the
right thing would be Y. For both students we used common sense
and healthy (at least, we would see it so) intuitive and human judg-
ment after we  had listened to their stories, often for a long time.
Student meetings with Lawrence, in contrast, were typically quite
short. After he had learned that these students fell in category A
(which was legally relevant), the case was  clear for him – there was
no need to learn about B, C, and D. In a nutshell, Lawrence analyzed
cases and thereby based his reasoning on legally relevant features,
ignoring everything the law is mute about. We,  in contrast, tried
to look at the entire situation and apply intuitive common sense
– often we did not even know all the subtleties of the law. The
clash of frames culminates in the following question: What is more
important, the rules or the people?
How would you, dear reader, approach such issues and how
would you decide? How would you feel as a student when talk-
ing to Lawrence and when talking to us? Do you think the faculty
would be better off, in the long run, if it were run by people like
Lawrence, or by us?
It seems the pair of archrivals, objectivity and subjectivity, man-
age to ﬁnd (and ﬁght) each other everywhere, including when it
comes to legal and moral issues, where they appear in the form
of objective but rigid rules and subjective but ﬂexible judgments.
The arguments and accusations they will elicit from the other side
remain the same, across domains: Too analytic, mechanistic, and
inhumane versus too intuitive, arbitrary, and unreliable. To see the
difference more clearly – and in fact, to this avail we  already exag-
gerated Lawrence’s and our stance a little bit – let us look, once
more, at caricatures. At the one extreme, courts and administra-
tions will be replaced by software. For every “case”, an interface
allows to enter the legally relevant information. There would be no
interviewer or human being involved in the process of data entry
as this could already open the gate for a subjective component – it
only has to be ensured that no false information can be fed into the
system. The software can then make decisions that are consistent
with the law, simply because the law is built into the software and
also determined which information has been requested. Systems
akin to George Orwell’s (1950) Big Brother will not only watch our
behavior, but also regulate it and be the ultimate judge.
At the other extreme, we have chaos and anarchy. No rules, no
order, human judgment all over, eventually even with no, or lim-
ited, memory of similar cases. People would use emotions, lies and
bribes to manipulate others, decisions would not be reliably made,
and in an absence of an objective and neutral institution people
will form alliances and ﬁnd other ways to get what they think they
deserve – and most of these ways will have the potential to destabi-
lize society. As Thomas Hobbs (1651) put it in his Leviathan,  without
law and order and strong governments, society will collapse in a
war of all against all.
No one, including Lawrence and us, would like to live in any
of these extreme worlds. Think of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:
each virtue is located between two  vices. Hence, the question
arises: What is the golden middle? Where exactly should one settle
on the continuum between the extremes, and how does one strike
a balance?
Our ﬁrst paper in this series, by Dhami, Belton, and Goodman-
Delahunty (2015), is exactly about this middle-ground between
intuition and analysis. Following Brunswik (1952) and Hammond
(1996), they refer to this middle-ground as quasirationality. In a
way, their article is closely related to our repeated discussions with
Lawrence. However, these authors do not look at student affairs in
an educational program; rather they focus on sentencing in the
context of court trials. How should a particular case or person, ide-
ally, be evaluated: by stepping back, abstracting from details, and
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pplying legal rules in an objective manner, or by getting closer,
eeing the speciﬁcs and using personal, eventually, intuitive judg-
ent? Dhami et al. look at both the legal system and at the actors
n this system. Speciﬁcally, they review how sentencing in com-
on  law jurisdictions in Australia, in the US, and in England and
ales is regulated and prescribed. As it turns out, none of these
egal systems resembles one of our extremes; they all strike the
alance between analysis and intuition, albeit with some variation
nd different tendencies towards the one or the other extreme.
oreover, the authors also study how decision makers – judges,
urors – actually function and decide in these legal environments,
hereby addressing the question whether or not there is a place for
ur Lady in Black in a legal environment.
With the next article – Dickert, Västfjäll, Kleber, and Slovic
2015) – we proceed from values and sentencing to valuation and
olicy making. The valuation of lives is a thorny issue as the follow-
ng story illustrates. Being a good mathematician can be hard, but
eing a good mathematician working for the military secret service
uring war times has its own challenges. Alan Turing (1912–1954)
as not only a good mathematician – he was a genius. And he found
is challenges when he got involved in a secret military project
hose purpose was to decrypt messages that the Germans sent
ith their Enigma machines. The Allies could receive all these mes-
ages, but without the key they were useless. To cut a long story
hort, the project was crowned by success and Alan Turing played
n eminent, possibly the decisive, role in building a general pur-
ose machine that was able to crack the key – every day, as the
ey would change every day. Such general purpose machines were
ater called Turing machines. Today we call them computers.
The larger challenge, however, was yet to come. What to do
ith the messages they could decipher? Should the British, for
nstance, prevent those ships from leaving the harbor about which
hey had learned that the German submarines planned to sink
hem? Had they done so, the Germans would soon have realized
hat their encryption method is no longer secret and they would
ave redesigned it. Turing’s work would have been in vain. It was
ence crucial for the British to use their intelligence wisely, but in
rder to do so they had to be smart and cruel at the same time: Save
s many lives as possible in the short run but sacriﬁce as many lives
s necessary to keep their success a secret and to save even more in
he long run. To implement this strategy, they had to turn people
nto numbers, just as Lawrence turned them into cases. Tucholsky
1925) told a cynic joke about a diplomat from the Quai d’Orsay (in
aris) who was speaking about the horrors of war: “War? I cannot
nd that so terrible. The death of a man: that is a catastrophe. One
undred thousand dead: that is a statistic.”
But is protecting two ships with 100 passengers each exactly
he same as protecting one ship with 200 passengers? How should
ne distribute resources in humanitarian catastrophes, such as
ars, hurricanes, or earthquakes? Should managers, civil servants,
oliticians and other administrators use Expected Value Theory or
xpected Utility Theory to determine which course of action is the
est when the goal is to save as many lives as possible? To the
xtent that every human live should count the same, no matter
hether it is one in a group of 1,000 or one in a group of 10,000,
t is rational to use expected Value Theory when it comes to val-
ating large number of lives. A deviation towards Expected Utility
heory would then be classiﬁed as irrational. Dickert et al. (2015)
ive into the world of policy making, discussing the intuitive val-
ation of human lives through the lenses of “classic” models of
ationality. In doing so, their work can be, perhaps, best situated
n the realm of the heuristic-and-biases and related frameworks.
hey ﬁnd that valuations of lives are prone to well-documented
iases when done intuitively. This result gives rise to a puzzling
nd disturbing question. Spontaneously, we show some sympathy
ith intuitive valuations. The Lady in Black as we depicted her ish in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
not at all destructive or cruel; rather she seems to be nice, friendly,
and someone whom one wants to have at one’s side. In contrast,
cold bureaucracy and number-crunching computers appear to be
inhumane and heartless – and not at all sympathetic. How can it
be that such a cold and analytic number cruncher would save more
lives than a kind-hearted do-gooder who is proud of valuing human
intuitions higher than abstract analyses?
The next paper by Raue, Streicher, Lermer, and Frey (2015)
focuses on a topic that is crucial for the two  previous papers, even
though the term is not mentioned in those: psychological distance.
Does it make a difference when decisions are made for a mere num-
ber, or a number that comes with a photograph, an acquaintance,
a relative, or oneself? Do emotions, moral sentiments, intuitions,
and subjectivity enter the room when cold rationality leaves it?
Recently, Angela Merkel, currently German Chancellor, was  ﬁlmed
in a “citizen dialogue” with a young refugee girl – a child, speak-
ing perfect German, who  had been living with the uncertainty to
be deported from Germany after having lived there for four years.
Merkel tried to explain the girl the rationale of German immi-
grant policies – initially in a cold, analytic, almost bureaucratic
discourse that contrasted with the tender emotions, vulnerabili-
ties, and dreams of a better life that the girl transmitted. At the
close of the interview, in speaking to the girl Merkel said something
like this: “politics is sometimes harsh. . .as you are standing now in
front of me. . ..  then you are an extremely sympathetic human. . .”
The moderator suggested Merkel to recall the girl’s face when talk-
ing about a possible new procedure in German immigrant laws.
Finally, the girl started crying, and Merkel walked up to her to caress
her (www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIjXkg33EDA). As of writing this
article, rumors are that the girl will not be deported.
Clearly, “psychological distance” matters, not only in policy
making and politics, but also for cognition and behavior. And
here she is again, the Lady in Black. This time, she comes to us
with Construal-Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010). This the-
ory assumes that only the present (e.g., time, beings, objects) lend
themselves to direct experience. In contrast, the future, other peo-
ple, different locations are mentally farther away. To illustrate,
what scares you more: dying of the same sudden cancer-related
death a close relative very recently felt victim to, or being executed
by a robot twenty years from now? Raue et al. (2015) lead us to ask
how the level of construal inﬂuences and interplays with decision
making. Their answer: Depending on how close or distant some-
thing or someone appears, concrete personal plans for tomorrow,
hopes for our beloved ones’ near futures, or fantasies of a brave new
world differ in nontrivial ways. They focus on risks, such as dying of
a disease. Their ﬁndings from three studies – with students, physi-
cians, and managers – “support the notion that both novices and
professionals are inﬂuenced by perceived psychological distance
when making decisions under risk” (Raue et al., p. 262). The authors
also lead us, the editors of this special issue, to ask another ques-
tion. Could it be that we had the idea of organizing and editing this
issue only because our own work is relatively far away from the
epicenter of intuition-research? Maybe it was  exactly this distance
that led us to underestimate the complexities and hence triggered
our decision to dare and to start.
Back to the thorny world of human morality. The last paper
in this section, by Baron, Scott, Fincher, and Metz (2015), allows
us to intuit possible answers to the question how can it be that
cold and analytic number crunchers would do, in numeric terms,
more good (e.g., save more lives) than kind-hearted do-gooder. It is
frequently argued, so Baron et al. point out, that overcoming pro-
hibitions (e.g., Do not kill!) and utilitarian appreciations of overall
consequences (e.g., letting a ship with a 100 passengers to be torpe-
doed to save one with 200 passengers) requires overriding intuitive
responses. Put differently, reﬂection creates distance and cold rea-
sons allow seeing the “bigger picture”, illuminating those complex
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spects of a multi-faceted dilemma that intuition leaves in the dark.
ut is this answer really doing justice to our Lady in Black, or is
t, though beautifully simple, too simple, perhaps even simplistic?
iving into the world of careful nitty-gritty experimental research,
n ﬁve studies Baron et al. invite us to critically reﬂect upon this and
elated propositions. They examine individual differences, which
hey measured in a panel of about 1200 participants, and leave us
ondering under what circumstance reﬂective thinking can really
e thought of as overriding intuition as opposed to people relying
n intuition simply because they do not reﬂect sufﬁciently upon a
roblem.
.5. Intuition in the wild
We  now move into the last room of our exhibition. The com-
on  theme of the pieces in this room is that they all focus on the
istinction between analysis, deliberation, or ratio on one side, and
mplicit or intuitive decision processes on the other – the bright
ide and the dark side. All of them are purely experimental papers,
nd none of them engage in modeling. Instead, they all describe
ehavior and leave it there. None of them interferes with the envi-
onment, manipulates or selects stimuli. The authors’ approach was
o simply ask research participants about situations that naturally
ccur in their daily lives. All three papers are linked to experience
nd expertise in the sense that participants were familiar with the
omains, situations, and type of decisions. In fact, they all could
ave been included in the ﬁrst exhibition room in which we placed
lein, Shanteau and Hammond. We  still decided to have two  rooms,
ne for those “elder statesmen” who adopted an aerial point of view
nd who contributed programmatic papers, and one for the last
riple of pieces from our “ethnologists” who collected fresh data in
he wild.
Chassot et al. (2015) take us in the domain of investment deci-
ions of ﬁnancial and energy experts. These experts operate in
arkets, they sit on millions of dollars, and they need to decide in
hich energy to invest. The authors focus on two forms of energy:
as and solar energy. The stakes are high, returns on investments
re measurable (albeit only ex post!), and the markets are compet-
tive. To the extent that enlightened investors who use ratio and
nalysis achieve better outcomes than romantic poets who make
uch decisions based on hunches and gut feelings during full moon
ights, one should expect that there is no place for our Lady in such
 world.
Would it make sense to ask those experts how they arrive at
heir decisions? If you think so, we invite you to reread the very ﬁrst
aragraph of the present article. But how could one look into the
arkness here if directly asking is problematic? The authors had an
ntuition how to shed a light at the unconscious of their ﬁnancial
nd energy experts. In a way, they followed the footsteps of Sig-
und Freud. But times have changed – they did not place people
n the couch but in front of a computer screen. Their research ques-
ion was whether unconscious attitudes toward renewable versus
on-renewable energy sources inﬂuenced investment behavior. To
easure such unconscious attitudes, Chassot et al. (2015) admin-
stered the Implicit Association Test. Note that Freud and many
ther psychoanalysts also used associations in their work, but they
licited and analyzed them in many sessions over many weeks.
s we already said, tempora muntur (times change). Today’s lives
ay  be a bit more hectic compared to those 100 years ago, and
ccordingly – and equipped with modern technology that did
ot exist back then – the present authors probed their experts’
ssociations and measured reaction times in the range of mil-
iseconds. One of the main results they report is a correlation
etween implicit associations and investment in solar energy. This
nding is even more interesting when contrasted with another
ne: explicit associations did not at all correlate with investmenth in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163 161
behavior. It seems our Lady in Black is able to operate in a domain
that looks, at ﬁrst glance, quite hostile for her with its charts,
reports, and analyses. And, consistent with her nature, she man-
ages to stay in the dark and to hide, even from those whom she
affects.
Like our previous authors, Brown and Daus (2015) focus on
experts’ job-related behavior, and they look into another aspect
of the Freudian id that is often considered to be related to intuition.
Speciﬁcally, they attempt to penetrate more deeply into the cave
of those implicit, mysterious, aspects of cognition that shape and
inﬂuence reason and that nurtured the ﬁre that consumed Goethe’s
Young Werther: emotions.
These authors studied police ofﬁcers, that is, those in society
who are there to enforce the supremacy of rules, society-built
rationality, and objectivity. Do police ofﬁcers succeed where
Werther failed? Are they able to control their emotions, in par-
ticular, their anger? But this is not the only variable of interest.
Brown and Daus also measured police-ofﬁcers’ inclination for
intuitive decision making, and, on a separate scale, their incli-
nation for deliberative thinking. As one of the relationships
among these three predictor variables, the authors found that
police ofﬁcers’ ability to control affect is positively correlated
with their rational decision making style. As their dependent
variables, the authors focused on the policer ofﬁcers’ inclina-
tion to issue a speed ticket and to discharge a weapon. One
of the ﬁndings – when explaining such job-relevant behavior
in terms of the predictor variable – was  that “high intuitive-
decision-making style had a stronger relationship with action when
police ofﬁcers felt a stronger propensity to control their anger”
(p. 300).
The last article, by Pachur and Spaar (2015), ends this special
issue where this introduction started. We reported what many
executives admitted to us, namely that they quite often rely on their
intuitions. Pachur and Spaar asked their participants, mostly stu-
dents, for which decisions they use them. Speciﬁcally, the authors
selected six domains – choosing a mate, dress, restaurant, doc-
tor, electronics, and vacation place – and examined, for each of
these domains separately, to what extend the participants prefer
an intuitive (i.e., spontaneous, affect-based) and to what extent
they prefer a deliberative (i.e., effortful, planned, and analytic)
decision style. In a way, their article is very closely related to
the one by Shanteau (2015). They both focus on domain-speciﬁc
differences. But the research question is different. Shanteau scru-
tinizes the performance of experts and relates it to properties of
the environments. He ﬁnds that experts perform better and are
more consistent in domains in which cues are positively correlated.
He looked at outcomes and performance, but does not report any
data that would speak to the question whether the experts actu-
ally used intuition. Pachur and Spaar ﬁll exactly this gap. Granted,
they do not model how people decide and whether they actu-
ally use intuition or analysis, but they probed people’s intuitions
about this question. They basically asked their participants, for
each of the six domains separately, how loud they cried “Oh lady
lend your hand, oh let me rest here at your side (Uriah Heep)” and
to what extent they felt that she was not “far away” and “ﬁlled
my heart with life.” The preferences participants reported for intu-
ition and for deliberation showed considerable variability across
the domains. In addition, domain-speciﬁc preferences for intuition
were consistently correlated with self-rated expertise in making
decisions in the respective domain – a ﬁnding that is entirely com-
patible with Klein (2003). Do repeated encounters with the Lady
in a particular domain boost self-rated expertise and possibly also
conﬁdence? Or does repeated exposure to similar situations allow
us to activate our cognitive autopilot and, while getting a bit sleepy
in this mode and entering her kingdom, we feel that she is at our
side?
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he various ideas and metaphors in a text with a clear structure,
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o read the text before you go to bed, and feel, when waking up the
ext morning, like having been visited by our dear friend, the Lady
n Black.h in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 145–163
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